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Abstract
Many studies of regional disparity in China have focused on the preferential policies received by
the coastal provinces.  We decomposed the location dummies in provincial growth regressions to
obtain estimates of the effects of geography and policy on provincial growth rates in 1996–99.
Their respective contributions in percentage points were 2.5 and 3.5 for the province-level
metropolises, 0.6 and 2.3 for the northeastern provinces, 2.8 and 2.8 for the coastal provinces,
2.0 and 1.6 for the central provinces, 0 and 1.6 for the northwestern provinces, and 0.1 and 1.8
for the southwestern provinces.  Because the so-called preferential policies are largely
deregulation policies that allowed coastal Chinese provinces to integrate into the international
economy, it is far superior to reduce regional disparity by extending these deregulation policies
to the interior provinces than by re-regulating the coastal provinces.  Two additional inhibitions
to income convergence are the household registration system, which makes the movement of the
rural poor to prosperous areas illegal, and the monopoly state bank system that, because of their
bureaucratic nature, disburses most of its funds to its large traditional customers, few of whom
are located in the western provinces.  Improving infrastructure to overcome geographic barriers
is fundamental to increasing western growth, but increasing human capital formation (education
and medical care) is also crucial because only it can come up with new better ideas to solve
centuries-old problems like unbalanced growth.
JEL Categories: D300, O180, O530, P250, P520, R110, R120
Keywords: China's Regional Growth Pattern, Economic Geography, Preferential Policies,
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Introduction
Substantial disparity in regional incomes is a reality in every geographically large
country, and the causes of the disparity are numerous and complex.  The enduring character of
many cases of regional backwardness is also a reality, for example, the Appalachians in the
United States, Northern Shaanxi in China, Chiapas in Mexico, and Madura in Indonesia.  The
persistence of regional poverty has led many prominent social scientists to see the primary
causes of entrenched regional poverty to be interrelated in a self-reinforcing manner.
Sociologists talk about the culture of poverty.  Psychologists highlight the absence of the drive to
achieve.  Classical Marxists expound on the systemic tendency of the capitalist economy to
generate a reserve army of unemployed.  Latin American dependenistas see domestic regional
disparity to be the inevitable reflection of the neo-imperialistic relationships in the international
arena, the global metropolis-periphery arrangement reproduced within the dependent economy.
Finally, neoclassical economists explicate the working of local dynamics that produce multiple
equilibria, with the “low-income trap” being one of the stable outcomes.
Natural scientists too have their own discipline-based explanations for spatial inequality
in economic development.  The most well-known recent example is the book Guns, Germs and
Steel by the physiologist Jared Diamond (1997).  One of Diamond’s main arguments is that
many types of innovation (especially those in agriculture and construction) are not transferable
across ecological zones.  So, in ancient times, while improved varieties of crops and beasts of
burden can spread from northern Asia in the East to Europe in the West (and vice versa), they
cannot be transmitted from the temperate zone in North America to the temperate zone in South
America because of the intervening tropics.  Biological endowments also matter.  Most areas of
Asia and Europe have more naturally pliable livestock (horses and cows) that can be harnessed
to help in war and production.  The African-equivalent of those animals, e.g., zebras,
hippopotamuses, antelopes, and wildebeests, have proved themselves, up to today, resistant to
efforts to turn them into beasts of burden.  Even the African elephant is temperamentally
3uncooperative compared to its Asian cousin.
There is clearly no shortage of explanations for regional disparity and its sometimes
centuries-long durability.  This surfeit of views is suggestive of inadequate understanding about
this phenomenon, and confusion about what to do about it.  What is clear, however, is that the
successful development strategies of some countries cannot produce the same salubrious results
when implemented in other national settings.  When China opened some coastal pockets for
foreign direct investment, these Special Economic Zones (SEZs) quickly blossomed into vibrant
export platforms and created backward linkages with the immediate hinterland.  When
landlocked Mongolia turned the entire country into a free trade and investment zone in the late
1990s, however, the inflow of foreign capital was a mere trickle compared to China’s
experience.  The specific lesson in this case is that the time-tested effective growth policy
package for a coastal economy, and minor modifications of it, are unlikely to work for an interior
economy.
Public concern for regional income disparity in China has been increasing quickly since
the early 1990s.  This concern is rooted in the widening of provincial income gaps that started in
the 1988–93 period, with the exact timing dependent on the method of measurement.  Figure 1
shows the coefficients of variation of per capita provincial incomes constructed from two
samples.1
The first sample consisted of 28 provinces that had complete income data for the 1952–
98 period.2  The coefficient of variation of GDP per capita (measured in 1995 prices) of the 28
provinces, Cov28, increased significantly from 0.45 to 0.54 over the 1958–60 phase of the Great
Leap Forward campaign to boost output growth through a combined program of large-scale
agricultural collectivization and large-scale investments in heavy industries.  The flow of
investment funds to the existing industrial bases in the Northeast was so massive that real GDP
per capita in 1958 jumped 40 percent in Liaoning, 25 percent in Jilin, and 34 percent in
Heilongjiang.  Unfortunately, the growth strategy of the Great Leap Forward turned out to be
disastrously wrong.  The resulting economic crash created a nationwide famine that brought the
                                                
1 Unless otherwise indicated, the income data are from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS 1999a).  The three
main components (primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors) of provincial GDP are recalculated at 1995 prices, and
then summed up to obtain the real GDP series of the province, measured in 1995 prices.
2 GDP data for Tibet and Hainan were available only after 1978.  Chongqing data were consolidated with those of
Sichuan by updating Sichuan data from the State Statistical Bureau (SSB 1997a) from 1996 onward with data on
Chongqing and Sichuan in subsequent years of the China Statistical Yearbook (SSB 1997b, 1998; NBS 1999b).
4country to subsistence level, a feat that had the fortuitous result of attenuating the provincial
income disparity drastically, as evidenced by Cov28 dropping to 0.38 in 1961.3  A steady
increase in provincial income inequality accompanied the recovery from the depression (1962–
65) and the renewed growth during the decade of the Cultural Revolution (1966–76).  Cov28
reached 0.68 in 1978, the eve of the implementation of market-oriented economic reforms.
Cov28 reversed course temporarily to decline gradually to 0.62 in 1987–89 before resuming its
upward march to reach 0.71 in 1998.
Cov28 may not be a satisfactory indicator of interprovincial inequality, however, because
it gives Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin (which are metropolises with province-level status) the
same weight as the provinces that are much larger in population and land area, and much more
diverse in economic characteristics.  We hence constructed another coefficient of variation,
Cov25, that excluded these three province-level cities.  Cov25 shows a much lower degree of
inequality than Cov28, and does not show the upward trend seen in Cov28 during the 1966–78
period (table 1).  These two differences mean that the three major cities have always been
substantially richer than the other provinces, and that the gap between them widened
substantially during the period of orthodox socialist economic management.  The vast gulf that
we see between urban and rural income in today’s market economy is definitely not a new
phenomenon.
Both Cov25 and Cov28 show that a clear upward trend in provincial income inequality
had emerged by 1992, and that the present level of provincial income disparity is unprecedented
since the founding of the new China in 1949.  Cov25 exceeded the 1961 peak of the Great Leap
Forward in 1995, and then went on to reach 0.43 in 1998.
By 1995, the obvious rise in regional inequality had caused the international news media
to raise the possibility of the political disintegration of China.4  The optimistic scenario for
China’s breakup is an amicable one.  The affluent provinces could now afford to quietly ignore
the authority of the central government, or to indirectly control the central government—a
situation in either case of de facto political independence for the affluent provinces.  The 11 May
                                                
3 In 1961, real GDP per capita fell 57 percent in Liaoning, 23 percent in Jilin, and 45 percent in Heilongjiang.  Per
capita income in these three provinces climbed back to their 1961 levels only in the mid-1970s—a feature that
indicates to us a general overstatement of output during the Great Leap Forward period.  It is estimated that about 30
million people starved to death during the four years of the Great Leap Forward.
51995 issue of the Far Eastern Economic Review carried on its cover the heading “Fragile China:
Affluent Regions Go Their Own Way” and it reported that the political scientist Susan Shirk
“knows of a half-dozen provincial functionaries who ‘have declined promotions to Beijing and
opted to stay at home to get rich and exercise informal political influence.’  With regional
fortunes so drastically on the rise, Shirk says, national politicians are tempted to play [to] the
provinces and outbid each other in pandering to local interests.”
The pessimistic scenario for the political disintegration is a civil war sparked by the
resentment of the poor provinces.  According to the economist Hu Angang, who advocates the
abolition of the SEZs: “If Deng Xiaoping knew the disparities were as big as they are, he would
be more militant than I am in trying to eliminate them ... In America, the deep differences
between the North and the South more than 100 years ago led to the Civil War,”5 and “We
must cease subsidizing rich coastal cities.  Preferential treatment should be reserved for the
poor.”6
The concern for social equity and social stability has led China’s top leaders to commit
themselves to accelerating the economic growth of the interior provinces.  The budgets for
infrastructure investments in the poor provinces have increased substantially every year, and a
Western Region Development Office has just been established under the State Council (the
Chinese cabinet) to formulate a comprehensive development strategy and to coordinate its
implementation.
The question of regional inequality in China has been extensively studied in recent years,
from both a microeconomic perspective (individual or household income inequality) and a
macroeconomic perspective (GDP per capita or consumption level differences between
provinces).7 The most commonly highlighted feature in the studies on regional disparity in the
                                                                                                                                                            
4 This important political backdrop explains why some of the recent outstanding books on China’s economic
geography are written by, or with, political scientists, e.g., Cheung, Chung, and Lin (1998), Wang and Hu (1999),
and Yang (1997).
5 “Deng’s Economic Drive Leaves Vast Regions of China Behind,” New York Times, 27 December 1995.
6 “China: A Chinese New Deal,” Newsweek, 9 October 1995.  The South China Morning Post (“Clash over
shrinking coffers,” 23 September 1995) reported that “Mr. Hu slapped the SEZs in the face by accusing them of
ripping off the rest of China – and widening the regional gap – by abusing the special policies granted them by the
Centre … [and he] concluded that the zones ‘should no longer be allowed to remain special.’ ”
7 To cite but a few: Lyons (1991), Tsui (1993, 1996), Lee (1994), Chan, Hseuh, and Luk, (1996), Chen and Fleisher
(1996), Zhao (1996), Fleisher and Chen (1997), Gundlach (1997), Mody and Wang (1997), Li, Liu, and Rebelo
(1998), Raiser (1998), Lin, Cai, and Li (1999), Naughton (1999), Wang and Hu (1999), Wu (1999), Berthélemy and
Démurger (2000), Chen and Feng (2000), Dayal-Gulati and Husain (2000), Démurger (2000, 2001), Wei (2000),
Aziz and Duenwald (2001), Fujita and Hu (2001), Kanbur and Zhang (2001), Tian (2001), and Zhang, Liu, and Yao
6post-1978 period is the growing gap in both the income levels and the income growth rates
between the coastal provinces and the inland provinces. A broad range of reasons has been
forwarded to explain the divergence of regional income.  Possibly the most common explanation
is that the coastal provinces have received preferential policies from the central government.
While there is no doubt that the preferential policies have promoted the growth of the coastal
economies, there is also no doubt that the coastal economies are most advantageously located to
engage in international trade, and hence are most able to industrialize by relying on
manufactured exports.  So, the coastal dummy variable used in many studies is an amalgam of
“pure geography effects” and “preferential-policy effects.”8
Some studies (Fleisher and Chen 1997, Mody and Wang 1997, and Démurger 2001) have
found an indirect route to assess the role of geography in regional growth by focusing on policy
measures that are undertaken to overcome geographical obstacles to trade, notably differences
such as infrastructure investment in communications, e.g., roads, railway, waterways, and
telephones.  These studies found that infrastructure investment has a statistically significant
positive impact on growth.9
This paper tries to provide further evidence for the distinct roles of geography and policy
by integrating some recent advances in regional science, ecology, and geography into economics
to arrive at some preliminary findings on the barriers to economic growth in China’s interior
provinces.  In particular, we use an original dataset that allows us to account directly for
geography (i.e., access to the sea and elevation/slope), and we propose alternative measures for
preferential treatment given to some provinces.  We then present estimates on the respective
contributions of preferential economic policies and geographical location to the growth of
China’s provinces.  The quantification and policy suggestions presented here are necessarily
tentative and primitive, because this is the first phase of a collective effort to understand this
longstanding problem of large regional inequality in China’s history.
Before detailing our analysis of regional disparity and our decomposition of the coastal
dummy into “pure geography effects” and “preferential-policy effects,” it is important to
                                                                                                                                                            
(2001).  Besides the English-written literature, there is also an important Chinese-written literature that is not cited
here.
8 One exception lies in Wang and Hu (1999, ch. 4), who provide some useful insights of the role China’s
heterogeneous geographical conditions can play in explaining regional economic disparities.
7understand what preferential policies really mean in the context of China.  The so-called
“preferential policies” extended to the coastal regions are in essence policies to marketize and
internationalize these coastal economies.  These preferential policies should rightly be called
“deregulation policies” because they allow these coastal provinces to operate in an economic
environment closer to those of their East Asian neighbors (and competitors).  Firms in these open
economic zones could import intermediate inputs duty-free to produce exports; collaborate with
foreign companies in investment, manufacturing and distribution; hire and fire workers in
accordance with their performance and demand conditions; and escape the confiscatory taxation
that is needed in a centrally planned economy to finance its vast, complicated system of social
subsidies.  In return for these economic liberties, these firms would not receive state subsidies
when they experience losses.
The adjective “preferential” gives the misleading sense that the prosperity of these coastal
economies had been sustained by a steady flow of state subsidies either from the state budget or
from the state bank system.  This has not been the case.  There was certainly pump priming in
the beginning (i.e. fiscal transfers and bank loans to build the infrastructure that would make
these open economic zones attractive to the transnational companies as export platforms), but
there were no significant steady transfers to prop up failing enterprises in order to maintain the
living standard in the region, as in the case of the northeastern provinces.  Only the latter could
truly be called preferential policies.  In short, because a centrally planned economy is an over-
regulated economy, what the preferential policies really did was to remove some of these
regulations, namely, the regulations against the marketization and internationalization of
economic activities.
2.  Assessing the importance of geography
On a global scale, the wealth of nations is well characterized by two geographical
divides.  The first geographical divide emphasizes differences in ecological conditions: the
temperate zone versus the tropical zone.  The second geographical divide emphasizes differences
in the ability to conduct international trade: the coast versus the interior.  As we will show, both
of these geographical divides are a combination of independent causes of economic wealth and
                                                                                                                                                            
9 Lin (2001) studied the role of geography in wage disparity, and found that the geography variables of market
access and supplier access explained about 15 percent of the gap between the wage rate of the provinces and the
8of proxies for some important determinants of economic prosperity.
The empirical validity of the temperate–tropical divide is well supported by the fact that
over 90 percent of the world’s poor lives between the tropic of Cancer and the tropic of
Capricorn.  The result is a GDP per capita (PPP-adjusted) of $3,326 in 1995 for tropical
economies, and $9,027 for nontropical economies.  This strong correlation between ecological
zone and income level is not a new observation in economics, e.g. Lee (1957) and Kamarck
(1976), but it has not been a major analytical organizing principle in development economics.
The incorporation of new insights from physical geography and societal dynamics have led
Diamond (1997), Landes (1998), Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), and Gallup, Sachs, and
Mellinger (1999) to focus on physical geography as an overarching explanation of economic
performance.
Bloom and Sachs (1998) have identified the virulence of diseases and the limited
potential for large gains in agricultural productivity in the tropics to be the key obstacles to
economic development in most areas of Africa.  This biology-based analysis is of course not the
only recent attempt to explain the upward income gradient that begins at the equator.  Hall and
Jones (1999) have suggested that the distance from the equator proxies for the relative
penetration of European economic institutions, and European-style economic institutions are the
ultimate engines of growth.
The coast–interior dichotomy highlights the importance of transportation costs in
determining a country’s participation in the international division of labor.  In the industrial age,
water transportation has the lowest cost for moving goods over extended distance.10  The growth
effects of trade are well known, beginning with Adam Smith’s observation that productivity
improvements are enabled by the greater division of labor that, in turn, is enabled by the
expansion of the market.  The clear policy lesson here is that investments in physical
infrastructure and transportation technology can change the comparative advantage of a region.11
The temperate–tropical dichotomy will not be a major analytical organizational principle
in this paper.  This is because China, unlike Brazil and Australia, does not have a substantial part
of its territory within the tropical zone.  The southern border of China extends only a few miles
                                                                                                                                                            
average national wage rate.
10 For example, the industrialization of central Europe was helped by the navigability of the Danube.
11 For example, the connecting of the Great Lakes to the Atlantic by the Saint Lawrence Seaway accelerated the
industrialization of the northern part of the American Midwest.
9beyond the tropic of Cancer.  This feature is of interest in itself because it is more than
coincidental that after centuries of steady southward expansion, the Chinese empire stopped at
approximately where the tropical zone begins.  While we will not dwell on the temperate–
tropical divide, the general point about differences in the development potential of different
ecological zones is an important one.  The appropriate development package for the arid plateaus
of northwestern China has to be different from the grain-growing plains of central China, and the
relevant development package for the wet, warm southwestern provinces has to take disease
vectors into greater account.
3.  China in time and space
China covers 9.6 million square kilometers and stretches from the temperate to
subtropical zones.  It is similar in size and climate to the United States but its topography is quite
different.  The most important difference is that the United States has coastlines running the
length of its eastern and western borders, whereas western China is landlocked.  China is also
more mountainous and hilly, with plains at less than 500-meter elevation making up only 25
percent of the total land area, and mountains and plateaus accounting for 60 percent.  These
topographic features of China imply higher transportation costs and a greater requirement for
physical infrastructure construction.  The task of economic development in China is hence more
challenging than in the United States.
Physically, China resembles a three-step staircase running downward from west to east.
It begins with the 4,000-meter-high Qinghai-Tibet Plateau in the west, proceeds to the highlands
and basins in the center that are about 1,000 to 2,000 meters above sea level, and ends with hilly
regions and plains that are less than 1,000 meters high.  The combination of higher precipitation,
a warmer climate, and access to navigable rivers and the sea have made the central and eastern
provinces more conducive for farming and trade; hence these areas became the population
centers of China.  The Qinghai-Tibet Plateau was traditionally the poorest region.
The location of China’s economic center has changed over time, moving eastwards from
the Loess Plateau and the Yellow River Valley in the northwest (where Chinese civilization
began in 2000 BC), which is about 1,000 kilometers away from the coast.  The reason for this
original location is that, in ancient times, high agricultural productivity and land-based trade was
much more important than sea-based trade.  The bulk of China’s international trade at that time
10
was conducted through the famous Silk Route that went through the northwestern corner of
China.   The southeastern coastal region, where Guangdong and Fujian (two of today’s most
dynamic provincial economies) are located, largely remained uncultivated and sparsely
populated in early Chinese history.  Although the natural conditions in the southeast were
favorable for agriculture, farming was undeveloped because malaria and other subtropical
diseases checked population growth, and the high temperatures sapped human energy faster,
resulting in lower labor productivity.  Guangdong was considered an almost uninhabitable place
in ancient times.12
Over time, the pressure of expanding population and the frequent invasions by the
northern tribes caused more of the population to move south and into the mid-coastal and
southeastern regions.  By the twelfth century, the Yangtze River valley had become very
developed and densely populated.  The economic importance of the coastal region increased
dramatically after the Opium War in 1840, when the Western powers forced China to first open
several ports and then the whole country for trade.  China’s economy and subsequently its
politics were quickly (by historical standards) transformed.  International trade expanded, foreign
direct investments flowed in, and local industrialists made their appearance, especially in the
mid-coastal and southeast regions.  The Qing dynasty was overthrown in 1911, followed by a
long chaotic period of protracted civil wars and Japanese colonialism, which ended with the
foundation of the People’s Republic of China on 1 October 1949 by the Communist Party of
China (CPC) under the leadership of Mao Zedong.
Table 2 summarizes some key geographical and economic characteristics of China in the
following six regional groupings that are useful for analyzing the post-1978 period.13
1. The metropolises of Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai have province-level status.
(Chongqing was granted province-level status in 1997, but we have included its data
under Sichuan province.)  These are the richest pockets of China and have had high
growth in the 1990s.  These cities are highly industrialized, and over 71 percent of their
population lives within 100 kilometers of the coast or navigable waters.  Beijing,
                                                
12 The great Chinese poet of the eleventh century, Su Dongpo (1037–1101), who was banished by the emperor to
Guangdong, wrote that the only saving grace of living there was the abundance of the lichee fruit:  “Having three
hundred lichees daily, I do not mind to be a person living in the south of Nanling Mountain [where Guangdong is
located].”
11
Shanghai, and Tianjin are the exceptionally rich (city) provinces.
2. The northeastern provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning, which are collectively
called Manchuria, were the industrial heartland of China in 1949 (because of the Japanese
control of the economy that started in 1905).14  During the central planning period, their
early start in industrialization was consolidated, making these provinces the part of China
that most resembled the Soviet Union in industrial organization and production structure.
In the national ranking of GDP per capita (after omitting the three metropolises)
Heilongjiang and Liaoning ranked first and second, respectively, in 1978 and ranked
seventh and fifth, respectively, in 1998.  Heilongjiang and Liaoning are the traditionally
rich provinces.
3. The coastal provinces are Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, and
Hainan (Hainan was separated out from Guangdong in 1988).  These seven provinces
have 82 percent of their population living within 100 kilometers of the sea or navigable
rivers.  They have grown the fastest of these six groupings in the 1978–98 period, at an
annual average of 10.7 percent.  The result is that Zhejiang and Guangdong have soared
to the top of the GDP per capita ranking (omitting the metropolises), from fourth and
sixth, respectively, in 1978 to first and second, respectively, in 1998.  Zhejiang and
Guangdong are the archetype of the nouveau riche provinces.
4. The central provinces are Shanxi, Henan, Anhui, Hubei, Hunan, and Jiangxi, through
which the plain runs relatively unimpeded from the north of the Yellow River to the
south of the Yangtze River.  The temperature and rainfall make this region the
agricultural heartland of China, which explains why its population density is almost twice
that of the northeastern and southwestern regions.  The two large rivers and their many
tributaries endow 57 percent of the population with easy water transportation.  The
Yangtze Valley between Wuhan and Shanghai has the industrial potential of the Rhone
Valley, possibly, multiplied several times.
5. The northwestern provinces of Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Ningxia, Gansu, Qinghai,
                                                                                                                                                            
13 The geographical delineation of China has varied from one study to another.  As the same term (e.g., “coastal”)
can refer to different subsets of provinces, we shall try to indicate to the reader whenever the regional term changes
meaning in our discussion of the literature.
14 The Japanese started their economic penetration into Manchuria in 1895, after defeating China over the control of
Korea.  They began their economic domination from 1905 by taking over Russian economic interests; rendered
Manchuria a puppet state after 1911; and formally annexed Manchuria in 1935.
12
Xinjiang, and Tibet (data of Tibet omitted) are truly isolated.  The center of the land mass
is 1,400 kilometers from the coast.  This region is more arid and steeper compared to the
four previous groupings, and it is marked by desert on its western and northern borders.
Furthermore, 5 percent of the land has a slope of greater than 10 percent compared to 2.5
percent for the northeastern, coastal, and central provinces.  The general lack of water
makes the region difficult for agriculture, and only 8 percent of the land is arable, which
helps explain why it has the lowest population density in China in 1998: 46 persons per
km2 versus 126 persons per km2 in the southwestern region, which has the next-lowest
population density.  A large number of residents are of Turkic origin and are practicing
Muslims.15  The Han people are in the minority in Xinjiang and Tibet.
6. The southwestern provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi have rainfall and
temperature conditions that are ideal for crop cultivation, but they suffer from being too
mountainous.  The average elevation is 1,428 kilometers, the average slope is 5.2
degrees, and 14 percent of the land has a slope of greater than 10 degrees.  The
proportion of arable land of 10 percent is barely above that of the arid northwestern
provinces.  Lacking the mineral resources of the northwestern provinces, the
southwestern provinces have the lowest GDP per capita in 1978, and the lowest growth
rates in the period of market-oriented reform.  A significant proportion of the population
belongs to non-Han ethnic groups.
                                                
15 In the 1950s, 3.5 million of Xinjiang’s population of 5 million were Muslims Uighurs, with Han Chinese
accounting for less than 200,000.  It is estimated that 6 million Han Chinese have settled there since then, bringing
the total population to about 16 million in 1994, with 62 percent belonging to non-Han ethnic groups.  Data are from
“Wang Enmao, 87, Who Ruled a Rebellious Chinese Province,” The New York Times, 23 April 2001, and
“Xinjiang’s Minorities Feel Torn Between Desire for Independence, Benefit of Economic Reform,” The Asian Wall
Street Journal Weekly, 5 September 1994.
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4. Regional economic policies in China
The central planning period, 1949–78
Industrialization was shallow in 1949 and largely a coastal phenomenon.16  In 1952, the
secondary sector produced 8 percent of GDP and employed 7 percent of the labor force
compared with the primary sector, which produced 74 percent of GDP and employed 84 percent
of the workforce.  The coastal provinces had 72 percent of fixed assets and accounted for 69
percent of the gross value of industrial output.17  Naturally, just like the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union in 1917, the CPC in 1949 saw its most important economic task to be
industrialization.
China adopted the two key sets of guiding principles behind the Soviet development
strategy: (a) the Marxist principles of common ownership with the state as trustee, and of
generalized egalitarianism; and (b) the Stalinist practices of central planning for resource
allocation, suppression of light industries and services in favor of heavy industries, and
minimization of trade and financial linkages with the capitalist economies.
Mao added a third guiding principle to China’s economic policymaking, the principle of
regional economic self-sufficiency: a region should be self-sufficient not only in food production
but in industrial goods as well.  This third principle unquestionably had the greatest impact on
regional economic outcomes.  The self-reliance principle had several virtues.  The first was that
it overlapped with the egalitarian principle because it reduced provincial inequality, which Mao
had identified to be one of the key social contradictions to be eliminated in the new China.18  The
second virtue was that the biggest beneficiaries of the self-reliance principle were the poorest
provinces (because they were overwhelmingly agricultural), and this distributional outcome was
in accordance with the gratitude that many veteran party leaders felt toward these provinces.
Many of the poorest provinces provided a haven for the CPC to rebuilt its strength after the
                                                
16 In this section we use the classification of coastal, central, and western provinces, which is the one commonly
used in official publications.  The coastal provinces are Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Zhejiang,
Fujian, Guangxi, Jiangsu, Guangdong, Hainan, and Shandong.  The central and western provinces are collectively
called interior provinces.  Wang and Hu (1999) used two schemes: (a) metropolitan cities, eastern provinces, central
provinces, and western provinces (Table 3.1); and (b) coast, central, and west (Table 6.1).  Wang and Hu’s
definition of coast corresponds to the official classification, and it equals, in their first classification, metropolitan
cities plus eastern provinces plus Guangxi.
17 The data are from Yang (1997, table 2.2).
18 Mao (1956).
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Kuomintang had driven it out of the urban areas.19
The third, and most decisive, virtue of self-sufficiency was that, beginning in 1963, it
coincided with the national security considerations of China.  The worsening Sino-Soviet
political relationship and the growing military presence of the United States in Vietnam
convinced Mao that regional economic self-sufficiency was key to China being able to engage in
a protracted defense of its territory.  Mao and his generals envisaged three lines of defense
(coastal, central, and western), and they decided in 1964 on a massive construction of military-
industrial complexes in western China, the third line of defense, popularly translated as the
“Third Front.”  To minimize the vulnerability of the third-front industries to air attacks, Lin Biao,
then the Defense Minister and Mao’s designated successor, instructed that these projects be
located “in mountains, in dispersion, and in caves.”20
The first two virtues of the self-sufficiency principle helped to ensure that the First Five-
Year Plan (1953–57) allocated 56 percent of state investment to the interior provinces, and that
the Second Five-Year Plan (1958–62) allocated 59 percent.  As the concern for national security
grew in the early 1960s, the Third Five-Year Plan (1966–70) allocated 71 percent of state
investment in the interior provinces, with the bulk of it in Sichuan, Hubei, Gansu, Shaanxi,
Henan, and Guizhou.  Furthermore, many companies in Shanghai and other coastal cities were
relocated to the mountains in Guizhou, Sichuan, and Hubei, where highways and railroads were
deficient or nonexistent, water and electricity were in short supply, and the sources of raw
materials were far away.  A significant proportion of the relocated factories could not produce
anything for many years, and the equipment rusted into junk.
Post-mortem studies of the third-front industries concluded that “only half of the factories
built performed to design specifications and the rest were either only partially completed (30
percent) or not completed at all (20 percent).  Fully one-third of the total investment was wasted
... .”21 One such example of wastage was the Second Automobile Company, built in the
mountains of Hubei.  The parts and assembly plants were scattered over the mountainous region,
transportation between the plants was poor, and they were far away from their input suppliers
                                                
19 According to Lane (1998): “Yan’an [in Shaanxi] became the cradle of the Chinese revolution and earned a lasting
place in the hearts of party members who lived there. ... The First Five-Year Plan (1953–57) targeted the province as
a key site for industrial development, and 24 of the plan’s 156 major projects undertaken with Soviet assistance were
located there.”
20 Quoted in Yang (1997, 19).
21 Yang (1997, 19).
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and the final consumers of their products.
Given the large amount of wastage that occurred in the industrialization of the interior
provinces, it is no wonder that even though the interior’s share of fixed assets went from 28
percent in 1952 to 57 percent in 1983, its share of the gross value of industrial products only
went up from 31 percent to 41 percent.  The primary causes of the higher productivity of the
coastal industries were that the coastal provinces had deeper pools of management and technical
expertise, better linkages between the industrial enterprises and the local economies, and a more
developed infrastructure.  It has been estimated that 100 yuan of fixed asset investment in 1978
yielded 70 yuan of output from the third-front enterprises, compared to 141 yuan from the
coastal enterprises.  The profit rate in 1978 was 9 percent for the third-front enterprises,
compared to 23 percent for coastal enterprises.22
The pouring of investment funds into the interior provinces was a clear violation of the
comparative advantage principle.  The growth of the interior provinces not only occurred at the
expense of the coastal provinces, it also lowered the overall growth rate of the economy.  The
discrimination against the coastal region was so severe that although Shanghai provided more
than 40 percent of the state revenue during the Cultural Revolution period, it was not even
allowed to retain enough funds to cover the depreciation of its capital stock.
From 1972 to 1978, China reduced its discrimination against investments in the coastal
provinces and increased its economic interaction with the capitalist economies.  This policy shift
occurred because the government realized that China’s economy and technological capacity was
falling further behind the rest of the world.  If this negative trend was not reversed, China might
not be able to defend itself.  Furthermore, because the Soviet Union was fast becoming a bigger
threat than the United States, an invasion through the traditional land route by the Soviet Union
had become much more likely than a coastal landing by armed forces supported by the United
States.  The national security justification for the third-front industries was hence undermined.
Economic modernization required the import of foreign technology, and this necessitated that
China increase its export earnings.
With the improvement of Sino-U.S. relations on course after Kissinger’s secret visit in
July 1971, the coastal enterprises, especially those in Guangdong, were expanded in order to
increase their export capacity.  Total export earnings jumped from US$2.6 billion in 1972 to
                                                
22 Data from Yang (1997).
16
US$3.4 billion in 1973, and continued soaring to reach US$9.8 billion in 1978.  Just as national
security considerations in the 1950s and 1960s had played a large part in justifying the bias in
favor of investments in the interior provinces, national security considerations in the face of
changes in international politics in the 1970s helped to reduce this bias.
The market-oriented reforms period, 1978–9823
The process of increased economic interaction with the outside world accelerated at the
end of 1978 upon the decisive political victory by the rehabilitated cadres over the remnants of
the Maoist establishment at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress.  The strategy on
the domestic front was the decentralization of agricultural production, the decentralization of the
fiscal system, and the deregulation of prices; the strategy on the international front was the Open
Door Policy.
Fiscal decentralization took the form of tax contracting between the central government
and the provinces.24  Each fiscal contract was individually negotiated, and it ranged from fixed
lump-sum contracts for five years, such as in the cases of Guangdong and Fujian, to highly
complicated (province-specific) revenue-sharing formulae.  The provincial governments in turn
negotiated individual revenue contracts with the local governments.  Since the marginal tax rate
set by the central government varied tremendously across provinces, the incentive of the
provincial and local governments to engage in local economic development in order to generate
tax revenue also varied tremendously.  Given the importance of Shanghai to the central coffers,
its marginal tax rate was set higher than that of most coastal provinces until the early 1990s.
The fiscal decentralization might have helped economic growth,25 but it led to state
revenue declining from 35 percent of GDP in 1978 to 14 percent in 1992, producing a near fiscal
crisis for the state.  The state lacked the funds to invest in infrastructure projects to remove
production bottlenecks and to undertake poverty alleviation programs.  The practice of each
provincial government covering more of its expenditure from local revenue necessarily meant
                                                
23 There is a keen controversy about what are the fundamental economic mechanisms in the rapid growth of China
after 1978.  Some economists (the experimentalist school) believe that the growth was enabled by the discovery of
new nonstandard economic mechanisms, e.g. collectively owned rural enterprises and fiscal contracting, while
others (the convergence school) see the growth as the result of moving toward a private market economy, whereby
best international practices are adopted and modified according to local conditions. See Sachs and Woo (2000) and
Woo (2001) for a review of this debate.
24 For details, see Wong, Heady, and Woo (1995).
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reduced development expenditure in the poorest provinces that had been receiving fiscal
subsidies from the center.  The tax reform of 1994 that had the value-added tax as its centerpiece
has reduced the discriminatory elements of the fiscal system, but it has not restored the fiscal
capacity of the state to help the poorer provinces significantly.26
The deregulation of prices in the industrial sector initially took the form of a dual track
price system for industrial inputs.  Since the central and western provinces were the main
suppliers of raw industrial materials, the continuation of artificially low prices for these industrial
inputs meant that the dual track pricing system was in effect transferring income from the
interior producers to the coastal factories.  The elimination of the dual track price system in the
1990–91 period was an equitable move from the viewpoint of regional disparity.
The Open Door Policy consisted of attracting foreign direct investment and promoting
foreign trade in targeted areas.  This opening up was initially limited to two southern provinces
(Guangdong and Fujian), then gradually was extended to larger geographical units: first along
the coast and then to the inland provinces.  The open economic zones provided investors with
various preferential tax treatments, and exemptions on duties and from labor regulations.27  The
implementation of regional preferential policies has gone through the following three broad
stages:
1. Early 1980s: opening to a limited extent, in Guangdong and Fujian provinces, with the
establishment of SEZs in 1979–80.
2. Middle to end of the 1980s: coastal preference strategy enforcement, with the designation
of Coastal Open Cities (COCs), which were entitled to set up their own Economic and
Technological Development Zones (ETDZs), in 1984; followed by the establishment of
Coastal Open Economic Zones (COEZs) in 1985; an Open Coastal Belt (OCB) in 1988;
and the Shanghai Pudong New Area in 1990.
3. Early 1990s: further extension of Open Door Policy to all of China, after Deng
Xiaoping’s southern inspection trip (nanxun) in 1992. During this year, new open
economic zones were officially started in Major Cities along the Yangtze River (MC),
Border Economic Cooperation Zones (BECZs), Capital Cities of inland provinces and
                                                                                                                                                            
25 The evidence on this front is mixed; e.g., Chen (forthcoming) and Zhang and Zou (1998) found negative
relationships between fiscal decentralization and economic growth. See the review in Woo (2001).
26 See Ahmad, Li, and Richardson (2000) for a recent discussion of China’s tax system.
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autonomous regions (CC), ETDZ, and Bonded Areas (BA).
Table 3 gives additional details of the establishment of these various types of economic
zones up to 1994.  The acceleration in the opening-up process in 1992 led to an inflated number
of so-called open economic zones, set up by local officials without proper authorization. Besides
the official policy launched by the State Council, the 30 provinces, as well as hundreds of
counties and townships, started to formulate their own preferential policies for foreign
investment in specific “development zones.”  As a consequence of this “zone fever” (Yang 1997,
53), there were around 2,000 open economic zones of various kinds at and above the county
level by 1993 (and probably even more below the county level), offering tax exemptions and
reductions of all sorts in order to attract investment. Following the implementation of the
austerity program in 1993, most of these unapproved zones have been closed,28 and regional
policies have tended to equalize over time (at least up to 2000).
The leading role of this selective open-door policy in regional growth has been
emphasized by a great number of studies (e.g. Lee 1994, Mody and Wang 1997, Berthélemy and
Démurger 2000, Chen and Feng 2000, and Démurger 2000).  Most of them found that foreign
direct investment (FDI) had an impact on economic growth that went beyond an addition to the
capital stock: it also provided competition to domestic firms and hence forced them to raise their
productivity, generated demonstration effects that enabled domestic firms to improve their
operations, and provided a training ground for future managers of domestic firms in the same
industries.  Démurger (2000) concluded that FDI was a very effective channel for technology
transfer that mainly benefited the coastal provinces, because most of the FDI was concentrated
there.
FDI inflows did not occur immediately in large volumes in response to the establishment
of the SEZs in southern China (1979 in Guangdong and 1980 in Fujian), partly out of caution
and partly because the liberal regulatory framework began to be introduced only in 1982.29  FDI
started pouring in only from 1984 onward (when it doubled from US$0.6 billion in 1983 to
US$1.3 billion in 1984).  This jump in total FDI in 1984 was not simply due to the opening of 14
                                                                                                                                                            
27 Details on the different preferential policies applied in these zones can be found in Yang (1997, ch. 3), Ma (1999,
ch. 7), Wang and Hu (1999, ch. 6), Chen (2000), and Démurger (2000).
28 For example, the central government closed 1,000 of the 1,200 economic development zones that it had not
authorized in the coastal provinces of Liaoning, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fuijian, Guangdong, and
Guangxi; see “State closes 1,000 EDZs to better efficiency,” China Daily, 13 August 1993.
19
COCs and 10 ETDZs that year, because there was an enormous rise in FDI into the existing
SEZs as well.  FDI into Guangdong increased from US$245 million in 1983 to US$542 million
in 1984, and FDI into Fujian increased from US$14 million to US$48 million in the same period.
This acceleration in FDI in 1984 was most probably the result of foreign investors being finally
convinced, by the opening of the 24 additional FDI zones, that China was committed to
integration into the world economy.
The second large acceleration of FDI inflow occurred in 1992, when FDI went from
US$4.4 billion in 1991 to US$11.0 billion in 1992.  This further increase in the confidence of
foreign investors was doubtlessly brought about by Deng Xiaoping’s call for increased economic
openness and his warning that China faced greater threats from leftist thinking than from rightist
thinking, during his nanxun in early 1992.30
5.  Regional development in China, 1952–98
Provincial growth experiences
The distribution of per capita GDP growth rates is given in tables 4 and 5.  Several
subperiods can been distinguished according to growth acceleration or deceleration.  This leads
to the following policy episodes:
• 1953–58: the orthodox centrally planned economy
• 1959–65: the Great Leap Forward, the economic collapse, and recovery
• 1966–78: the Cultural Revolution
• 1979–84: first reform phase, emphasis on agriculture
• 1985–91: second reform phase, Oskar Lange-inspired reforms
• 1992–98: third reform phase, the ultimate goal of which is a market economy with
substantial diversification of ownership structure
Figure 2 shows that there is no evidence of any unconditional β-convergence across
Chinese provinces during the planned and reform periods.  This is confirmed by cross-section
regressions on the whole period and by subperiods (not reported here), which all indicate that
there is no significant relationship between the per capita GDP annual growth rate and its initial
                                                                                                                                                            
29 Jiang Zemin played a prominent role in getting the liberal regulatory framework for SEZs passed in November
1981; see Gilley (1998, 68).
30 See Lemoine (2000) for an excellent analysis of FDI, and its role in international trade in China.
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level, except for the last subperiod (1992–98), during which a β-divergence phenomenon
emerged.31
Provincial income disparity, 1952-98
Table 6 shows the ranking of China’s provinces by GDP per capita (1995 prices) in key
years of China’s economic history.  The data indicate the following:
1. The provinces that moved up most in the income ranking during the planned period were
Beijing, Qinghai, and Ningxia, and the provinces that moved down most during the
reform period were Qinghai and Ningxia.  The rise of Beijing’s relative standing, and the
maintenance of its attained income rank, reflected its paramount political status in the
country.  The initial large gains of Qinghai and Ningxia (up 10 and 8 places,
respectively), and the subsequent large reversals (15 and 10, respectively) showed the
tremendous transfer of resources to interior provinces during the planned period.
2. There has been basically no change at the very top and the very bottom of the scale.  The
three metropolises were in the top tier throughout the whole period, and Yunnan,
Shaanxi, Gansu, and Guizhou remained the poorest provinces.  Mobility, both upward
and downward, was a middle-class phenomenon.
3. The provinces that improved their ranking most significantly during the reform period
were the coastal provinces, especially Fujian, Shandong, and Hainan.  The traditional
industrial bases of northern China (Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning) and the western
provinces experienced a decline in their income rankings.
Table 7 examines income inequality further by focusing on the changes in the gap
between the five richest provinces and the five poorest provinces.  The absolute income gap
increased tremendously in both the planned and reform periods.  The relative income gap,
defined as the absolute gap normalized by the average national income, increased from 1.0 in
1952 to 1.5 in 1978 and then dropped slightly to 1.4 in 1998.  The ratio of the incomes of the two
groups rose from 2.6 in 1952 to 3.4 in 1978 and then to 3.6 in 1998.  The relative income gap
and the income ratio essentially agree that the disparity between the richest and the poorest
provinces did not change during the reform period.  In any case, the changes in the relative
                                                
31 The corresponding cross-section regression is g92-98 = −0.022 [0.059]+ 0.016 [0.007] * Ln(p.c.GDP91). The values
shown between brackets are robust standard errors. The number of observations is 29, and the R-squared is 0.1.
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income gap and in the income ratio in the reform period are small compared with the changes in
the planned period, where the respective increases in 1952–78 were 52 percent and 31 percent.
The relative movements during 1952–78 and 1978–98 confirm the conclusions of urban bias and
industry bias drawn from the movements of the coefficient of variation for all provinces, Cov28.
6.  Geography and differences in per capita income
In this section, we provide a preliminary impression of how much of the difference in per
capita GDP levels across provinces could be accounted for by geography.  Our knowledge of
changes in China’s economic structure and policy regime in the 1952–98 period suggests at least
two channels through which geography has influenced provincial income levels.  The first
channel is agriculture, and the second channel is international trade and FDI.
China was a predominantly agricultural economy until the middle of the 1980s.  The
proportion of the national labor force employed in agriculture was 71 percent in 1978, 59 percent
in 1988, and 50 percent in 1998.  There were big differences in the degree of structural
transformation across provinces, but agriculture remains the dominant economic sector for most
noncoastal provinces.  To illustrate the continued importance of agriculture, table 8 reports the
agricultural share of employment and output in selected western, central, and coastal provinces
for 1978, 1988, and 1998.  In 1978, the agricultural share of employment in 1978 was over 70
percent in the northwestern, southwestern, central, and coastal provinces, and about 50 percent in
the northeastern provinces.  The 1998 agricultural shares of labor in the northwestern,
southwestern, and central provinces were all over 58 percent, still significantly higher than the
1978 agricultural share of labor in the northeastern provinces.  The agricultural share of GDP in
1988 was over 25 percent for the northwestern, southwestern, central, and coastal provinces; it
was over 35 percent for the central and southwestern provinces.  Given the large size of the
agricultural sector in many provinces during 1978–98, agricultural productivity was an important
determinant of provincial income per capita.  Since differences in provincial topographical
features, such as elevation and flatness of arable land, help shape differences in agricultural
productivity across provinces, they should also help to explain differences in provincial income.
Geography also affects provincial income through physical location.  The low cost of
water transportation makes the coastal provinces and areas along navigable rivers that flow to the
sea better suited to be platforms for producing manufactured exports.  When allowed by the
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government, domestic firms located in these regions would naturally expand production to
service foreign markets, and foreign firms would relocate their production there, given the low
cost of Chinese labor.  Hence, provinces with easy access to sea transportation received boosts to
their incomes from international trade whenever China did not cut itself off from the
international economy.
We use three benchmark years—1952, 1978, and 1998—for our econometric exploration
of the role of geography in provincial income determination.  The 1952 distribution of provincial
GDP per capita is regarded as the outcome, primarily, of market forces because of the newness
of the communist regime, and, secondarily, of the various dislocations from the recent wars.  The
1978 distribution of provincial income levels is taken to reflect primarily the biases of the central
planning system, and secondarily the efforts since 1972 to increase exports (in order to pay for
technology imports).  The 1998 distribution is seen as the joint result of the marketization and
internationalization of the economy since 1979.
The impact of geography on income per capita in 1952, 1978, and 1998 is tested using
the following explanatory variables.
1. The ability to participate in sea-based international trade
• Distance from the coast [Distf = 1/(1+distance in km)]
• Percentage of population being able to engage in international trade easily: (a) the
proportion of the population distribution of a province in 1994 within 100 km of the
coastline or ocean-navigable river, excluding the coastline above the winter extent of sea
ice and the rivers that flow to this coastline [Pop100cr]; and (b) the proportion of the
population distribution of a province in 1994 within 100 km of the coastline, excluding
the coastline above the winter extent of sea ice [Pop100km].32
2. Topography
• Percentage of area within a province with a slope greater than 10 percent [Slope10]
• Average slope of a province [Slavge]
• Average elevation [Elavge]
We regressed various combinations of the above explanatory variables using two
                                                
32 The assumption is that the distribution of population across China has not markedly changed from 1952 to 1998,
thus allowing us to consider the 1994 figure as an indicator for population distribution throughout the pre-reform
period.  This assumption is likely to be valid because the household registration system was designed to keep people
in the places where they were born.
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different data sets: one included all provinces, except Tibet; the other also excluded Beijing,
Shanghai, and Tianjin because they are potential “outliers” (because of their small size,
specialized economic structure, administrative role, etc.).  Table 9 summarizes the results
obtained from the different regressions.
Three robust results deserve particular attention because of their interesting implications.
First, the three proxies for easy coastal access improved greatly in statistical significance in
1998.  Pop100cr was not significant in any of the myriad of specifications for 1952 and 1978,
and “distance from the coast” jumped from a 10 percent significance level in 1952 and 1978 to a
less than 1 percent significance level in 1998.  This turn to extremely strong statistical
significance for the three proxies suggests that the ability of a province to engage in international
trade and to host FDI is now a very important determinant of provincial income because of the
post-1978 reform policies.
The second interesting robust result is that the “flatness” of land within a province was an
important factor in provincial income determination in all three years.  An average slope of over
10 degrees always lowered provincial income, and the constantly high statistical significance
seen in this relationship could have been generated by geography coming through both the
agriculture channel and the trade channel.  A steep landscape raises the costs for cultivating
crops and transporting goods (and this cost relationship could well be a nonlinear one).
Infrastructure construction such as terracing and tunneling can sometimes solve the problem of a
hilly terrain, but it is always an expensive solution—even when the solution is an imperfect one.
The third interesting robust result is that the 2R  is highest in 1998 and lowest in 1978.
For example, for the smaller data set, the specification with Pop100km and Slope10 reports an
2R value of 0.54 for 1998, 0.16 for 1978, and 0.20 for 1952.  The fact that the regression
specifications fits the data better in 1998 than in 1978 is not surprising, because China had
pursued autarkic policies in the two decades prior to 1978, hence weakening the trade channel
through which geography asserts itself.  The finding that the statistical fit in 1998 was much
higher than in 1952 is somewhat surprising, because only a limited part of the communist
economic strategy had been enforced by 1952 and it was unlikely to have greatly modified the
provincial distribution of pre-1949 market-determined incomes.  This difference in fit of the
income regressions for 1952 and 1998 suggest many possible explanations, but two of them are
most relevant to our geography focus.  First, the world today is more integrated economically
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than in 1952, so the gains from economic internationalization may be greater now than in 1952.
Second, a favorable geography could have a positive, but slow and cumulative, impact on
income, hence yielding a substantial lag between geographical advantage and higher income
level.  Both of these explanations would predict that the coefficients and statistical significance
of the geography variables in a growth regression would be larger in the later subperiods of the
estimation period.  This prediction is borne out in the growth regressions reported in the next
section.
7. Provincial differences in growth rates (1978–98): Geography and policy
As mentioned at the beginning, an increasingly widespread concern since 1992 is the
growing divergence between coastal and noncoastal provinces, in both per capita GDP growth
rates and levels.  Among the explanations given for the regional divergence are the following:
1. Preferential policies: the implementation of preferential policies in coastal provinces as
early as the beginning of the 1980s led to a rapid integration into the world markets, huge
inflows of FDI, and the development of modern industrial sectors in these provinces.
2. Geographic reasons: coastal provinces benefit from a higher percentage of arable land,
better conditions to develop infrastructure, and an easy access to the sea.  A coastal
location is certainly more convenient for export-oriented processing industries, which
have been developing very rapidly during the last 20 years.
Up to now, the two factors—geography and preferential policy—have been mainly
accounted for through a coastal dummy.  To organize the discussion, table 10 reproduces some
regression results from the literature on regional growth.  As can be seen from Jian, Sachs, and
Warner (1996) and Zhang (forthcoming), the coastal dummy does significantly account for
differences in economic growth among provinces.33  As pointed out by Jian, Sachs, and Warner
(1996), the implication in terms of provincial inequality of including a coastal dummy is
ambiguous.  Indeed, if the coast effect comes from the preferential policies, then their removal
will slow down the coastal provinces and maintain existing inequality.  However, if the coast
effect represents geographical advantage, removal of preferential policies would not halt the rise
in provincial inequality.
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Further attempts to account either for the policy factor or for the geographical factor have
been made separately by Wang and Hu (1999) and Bao, Chang, Sachs, and Woo (forthcoming).
Since provincial FDI is highly correlated with provincial GDP growth, Wang and Hu’s (1999)
regressions can be interpreted as provincial growth regressions.  Wang and Hu (1999) distinguish
an “economic model,” which says that foreign funds flow to areas with the best growth potential
(indicated by adequacy of infrastructure, availability of educated workforce, and size of market),
from a “policy model,” which says that foreign funds flow to areas with the most preferential tax
treatment.  Their estimations show that the addition of a preferential policy index removes the
statistical significance of variables championed by economic model.  Coastal growth would thus
be more the result of preferential policies than of their more favorable economic conditions.
Wang and Hu (1999, ch. 4) discuss in detail the importance of physical terrain in determining
economic growth.  They also note that their “policy variable may also reflect a province’s
geographical location.”  Nevertheless, their policy discussion ignores the geography factor as the
main reason for the success of the coastal provinces.  Finally, Bao, Chang, Sachs, and Woo
(forthcoming) use geographic characteristics to explain differences in provincial economic
growth and find that geographical determinism fits the data well.  However, they did not show
that policy does not matter, especially if policy stance is collinear with geographical location.
Our approach in this paper consists in replacing the black box of regional dummies with
two variables:
1. transportation cost and pure geography effect, represented by the proportion of the
provincial population in 1994 living within 100 kilometers of the coast or navigable
rivers that flow to the sea (excluding the coastline above the winter extent of sea ice and
the rivers that flow to this coastline) [Pop100cr]
2. a preferential policy index for each province [Policy]
The construction of the preferential policy index is based on the number of designated
open economic zones in a province and the extent of the preferential treatment.  The construction
of this index relies on available information on designated open economic zones across China,
gathered from different sources, as well as a subjective classification based on their importance
in terms of special treatment given to investors and industrial enterprises.  Given the various
                                                                                                                                                            
33 Note that in Zhang (forthcoming), the coastal dummy and export variable are insignificant in 1978–84 but
significant in 1985–95. Zhang explains this difference by the fact that exports (and more generally, international
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degrees of preferential policies that open economic zones offer, we gave to their host provinces
the following weights:
Weight = 3: SEZ and Shanghai Pudong New Area
Weight = 2: ETDZ and BECZ
Weight = 1: COC, COEZ, OCB, MC, BA, and CC
Weight = 0: No open zone
Table 11 reports the results of this scaling.  We want to stress that the policy factor is
restricted to purely open-door preferential policies and does not take into account other factors,
such as the business environment.  Moreover, disentangling geography and policy may not be an
easy task because preferential treatments are obviously related to geography; for example, one of
the main determinants in choosing Shenzhen as a SEZ was its location next to Hong Kong.
Fortunately, the correlation between them does not appear to be so close that disentanglement
would be a hopeless task.  The coefficient of correlation between the average value of the policy
index over 1978–98 and the proportion of provincial population in 1994 with easy access to sea
transportation [Pop100cr] is 0.54.
Estimation results
Table 12 presents a preliminary decomposition of the effects of geography and policy.
Equations 1 through 3 regress the provincial output growth rate in the different subperiods of the
reform era on the initial income level and the coast dummy.34  This simple formulation produces
coefficients with the theoretically expected signs almost all the time: a negative coefficient for
initial output level and a positive coefficient for the coast dummy.  However, the low t-statistics
of the output coefficient mean that conditional convergence does not accurately describe the
behavior of provincial output growth in China.  The interesting result is that the coefficient of the
coast dummy increases markedly in size over the subperiods, from 0.017 in 1979–84 to 0.022 in
1985–91, and then to 0.039 in 1992–98.  The growing influence of the coast on output growth is
confirmed by the monotonic increase in its t-statistics over time, from 2.98 in 1979–84 to 5.11 in
1992–98.
Equations 4 to 6 in table 12 replace the coast dummy with the Policy variable and the
                                                                                                                                                            
integration) reached a critical mass to become an important boost to China’s economy only after 1985.
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Pop100cr variable as the proxies for, respectively, provincial access to preferential treatment of
foreign investment, and provincial access to water transportation.35  Roughly speaking, the
magnitude of the policy coefficient is stable over time (0.01), while the magnitude of the
geography coefficient increases over time (from zero to 0.04).  As will be confirmed later, this
large difference in the temporal profiles of the policy coefficient and the geography coefficient
continues to hold in more sophisticated specifications of the provincial growth equations.
The contrasting time profiles of these two coefficients emphasize the intuitively sensible
point that the time lag between impact and effect could differ substantially among variables.  In
such situations, estimations based on averaging the variables over the entire time period or on
pooling the data set would understate the coefficients of the slower-acting variables.  This point
is clearly seen in equations 7 and 8.  The estimated coast coefficient is 0.0267 when the data are
averaged over the entire 1979–98 period, and 0.0387 when the data are averaged only over the
1992–98 subperiod; and the estimated geography variable is 0.0145 for 1979–98 data and 0.0427
for 1992–98 data.
The coast coefficient in 1978–84 is, however, not statistically different from its value in
1992–98: the two standard deviations confidence interval (2SDCI) for them are [0.0057, 0.0289]
and [0.0236, 0.0538], respectively. The coefficients for Pop100cr in 1978–84 and 1992–98 are,
on the other hand, statistically different from each other, their 2SDCI being [0.0020, 0.0282] and
[0.0307, 0.0545], respectively. It appears that the reason why the coast coefficient did not vary
sufficiently across subperiods is because the Policy coefficient (Policy being a component of
coast) was stable across the subperiods.  The 2SDCI for the Policy coefficient is [0.0017, 0.0095]
in 1978–84 and [−0.0047, 0.0246] in 1992–98. The most important finding, of course, is that the
geography coefficient unambiguously increased over time. This finding in table 12 lends
credence to the impression given in table 9 that geography is a slow-acting variable.
The fact that the R2 is highest in the 1992–98 subperiod means that this particular
specification of the provincial growth equation is most valid for this subperiod.  We will hence
focus our discussion more on the cross-section estimation results from the different subperiods
                                                                                                                                                            
34 In work not reported here, we found that changes in periodization did not change the character of the results
reported in tables 12 and 13.
35 To be more accurate, because the values of Pop100cr and Policy are province-specific, we have replaced all the
possible regional dummies not just the coastal dummy.
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than on those based on averaging the entire time period.36
Table 13 reports the estimation results of more complete specifications of provincial
growth equations.  All of the additional variables received only partial statistical support, and this
may reflect the well-known difficulty of estimating parameters reliably when the sample size is
small.  For example, equations 7, 8, 9, and 12 estimate nine parameters each with a sample of 25
observations.
The initial size of the agricultural sector is included because China’s economic reform
started with the large-scale deregulation of this sector.  A squared term of the agriculture variable
is added because Tian (1999) found a diminishing role for agriculture.  The agriculture variables
have the theoretically expected signs in all twelve cases, and they receive strong statistical
support in two cases and satisfactory statistical support in two other cases.
The insertion of the initial size of the state sector variable is based on Sachs and Woo’s
(1994) argument that the maintenance of the existing state-owned sector would require the state
to give state-owned enterprises (SOEs) priority access to capital, raw materials, and skilled
manpower, hence making it difficult for new non-state enterprises, like rural industrial
enterprises, to emerge.  This SOE variable has the theoretically expected sign in most of the
cases, and strong statistical support in half of them.  Strong statistical support for the SOE
variable is always seen in the first subperiod, 1979–84, and this particular confirmation of the
Sachs-Woo hypothesis is not surprising because this is the period when the Chinese government
was most committed to maintaining the primacy of state ownership in the industrial sector.
The education variable is the proportion of the provincial workforce that had a post-
primary education37.  Education always had the correct sign, and received strong statistical
support in two of the four cases.  The transport variable is measured by the density of the road-
railway-canal network.  It has the expected sign in two of the four cases, and satisfactory
statistical support in only one instance.
The different specifications in tables 12 and 13 yield four common conclusions.  First,
conditional convergence is only hinted at, rather than statistically supported.  In table 13, the
initial GDP level has the correct sign in 11 cases out of 12, and strong statistical support in only
                                                
36 This is also why we present the results of the pooled regressions as an appendix table and not in the main text.
While the pooled regressions yielded parameter estimates that were similar to cross-section regressions on data
averaged over the entire 1979–98 period, they had much lower R2 values.
37 Data on education are drawn from Démurger (2001).
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one case (equation 12).  Second, the Pop100cr coefficient increases in magnitude and statistical
significance over time.38  Third, the Policy coefficient generally is stable in magnitude across
time and receives strong statistical support.  Fourth, all the specifications fit the data best in the
1992–98 subperiod (with the R2 in table 12 rising from 0.55 in 1979–84 to 0.87 in 1992–98), and
we attribute this to the slow-acting nature of geographical forces.
The economic mechanisms of preferential policies and geography
We constructed the provincial preferential policy index to reflect the extent to which the
province had exempted the establishment of foreign-funded enterprises (FFEs), the profits of
FFEs, the international trade transactions of FFEs, and the domestic operations of the FFEs from
the restrictive state regulations governing the enterprise sector, particularly the foreign enterprise
sector.  Differences in provincial policies no doubt help to explain the distribution of FDI within
China, but this is not a zero-sum game for the country.  Collectively, these policies attracted
substantial FDI that would have otherwise flowed to other East Asian economies.  By
government intent and design, the main growth mechanism of the provincial preferential policies
is FDI.
Geography, in comparison, manifests itself through two growth mechanisms: FDI and
rural industrial enterprises.  As most FDI in China is export-motivated, FDI would (ceteris
paribus) prefer provinces that provide easier access to sea transportation (which is what the
Pop100cr variable is designed to proxy for).  Since a large and growing proportion of China’s
exports are produced by rural enterprises (in many cases, initially as subcontractors to SOEs and
FFEs), it has been natural for these export-oriented rural enterprises to be established in the
coastal provinces.  It appears that these rural enterprises had generated agglomeration effects and
backward economic linkages that induced new rural enterprises (not necessarily export-oriented)
to locate themselves in the same localities, thus making the coastal region a major growth area.
The opening of trade, in brief, allowed geography to establish FDI and rural industrial enterprises
as its main growth mechanisms.  Quantitatively, this second mechanism of rural enterprises has
been much more important in China’s growth.39
                                                
38 For equations 4 and 6 in table 13, the 2SDCI for Pop100cr is [−0.014, 0.0208] in 1978–84 and [0.0219, 0.0437] in
1992–98; and the 2SDCI for Policy is [−0.001014, 0.0076] in 1978–84 and [0.0010, 0.0212] in 1992–98.
39 Woo (1998) found that rural industrial enterprises accounted for almost 30 percent of the increase in output during
1985–93.
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Table 14 presents the evidence on the proposed economic growth mechanisms of the
Policy and Pop100cr variables.  Part A of table 14 reports the interrelationship between FDI,
Policy and Pop100cr for the 26 provinces analyzed in tables 12 and 13.  There are two
noteworthy results.
First, the FDI-Policy link is stronger than the FDI-Pop100cr link.  The correlation
coefficient of FDI-Policy is larger than the correlation coefficient of FDI-Pop100cr for all time
periods, suggesting that Policy had a greater influence than Pop100cr in determining the location
of FDI.  This suggestion is bolstered by the fact that the FDI-Policy correlation coefficient is
always strongly statistically significant (with the weakest link at the 0.3 percent significance
level in 1985–91), which is not true of the FDI-Pop100cr correlation coefficient.
Second, geography became a bigger determinant in the location decision of FDI over
time.  The FDI-Pop100cr correlation coefficient rose from 0.23 in 1979–84 to 0.4 in 1985–91,
and then to 0.55 in 1992–98.  (These figures are still smaller than the smallest FDI-Policy
correlation coefficient, 0.66 in 1985-91.)  The tightening of the FDI-Pop100cr link over time is
likely to be the result of the following:
1. the gradual extension of preferential policies to other provinces, as evidenced by the
decline in the coefficient of variation for Policy from 2.8 in 1979–84 to 0.4 in 1992–98
(see part C of table 12)40; and
2. geography having a longer lag on FDI compared to Policy (which may explain the
difference in the temporal profiles of Pop100cr and Policy on provincial income growth
that we had identified in tables 9, 12 and 13).
Part B of table 14 supports our hypothesis that geography also influences the location of
rural enterprises, the most important engine of growth since 1984 (Woo 1998).  The typical
coastal province employed a larger proportion of the workers employed in rural enterprises
nationwide (6.5 percent) compared to its endowment of labor resources (4.7 percent) and
compared to its share of employment in the SOE sector (4.3 percent).  While the
disproportionately higher concentration of FFE employment in the typical coastal province (10.7
percent) could be “blamed” on the preferential policies extended to it, the disproportionately
                                                
40 When many regions could offer virtually the same incentive package to FDI, transportation costs naturally
become more important in the considerations of the foreign investors.
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higher concentration of rural enterprise employment cannot be attributed to the preferential
policies.
Our hypothesis of the coastal provinces being “geographically advantaged” for growth is
also supported by the provincial distribution of investment within each type of enterprise form.
The typical province in the coastal region has a higher share of the total rural enterprise
investment and of the total FFI investment (10 percent and 8 percent, respectively) compared to
its share of total national investment and total SOE investment (7 percent and 6 percent,
respectively).
To make our point that FDI is one of the economic growth mechanisms enabled by the
Policy and Pop100cr variables, table 15 reports the regression results of adding FDI into our
preferred specification in table 13.  FDI received strong statistical support in only one of the four
cases, and its presence reduced the t-statistics of Policy and Pop100cr in every case.  The
transformation of the Policy coefficient into statistical insignificance by the inclusion of FDI
most likely reflects the strong multicollinearity between these two variables documented in part
A of table 14.  The results in table 15, therefore, are consistent with our hypotheses that (a) FDI
into China and its distribution within China has largely been induced by Policy and Pop100cr,
and (b) the growth of the rural industrial sector has been accelerated by Pop100cr.
8. Conclusion
During the central planning period, the high and increasing degree of provincial income
inequality reflected the unusually high per capita income of Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, and
the growing income gap between these three metropolises and the rest of the country.  Shanghai
stayed unchallenged at the top of the provincial income ranking during the entire 1952–78
period.  Beijing moved from ninth place in 1952 to second place in 1978; Tianjin moved from
fourth to third.  This revealed that the urban bias of China’s central planners was in reality an
obsession with industrialization that was passed on by their Soviet mentors.  This policy
favoritism toward the industrial sector is nicely illustrated by the fact that the industrial heartland
provinces of Heilongjiang and Liaoning held the fourth and fifth places, respectively, in the 1978
ranking of provincial income.
The central plan suppressed agricultural prices and exaggerated industrial prices to
generate investment funds for the industrial sector.  Agricultural collectivization, while
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recommended on ideological grounds, facilitated the extraction of the agricultural surplus for
industrial investment.  The tragedy of the Great Leap Forward experiment was, arguably, the
result of taking the Soviet religion of industrialism one step too far.
The combination of low agricultural prices, high taxation, and the badly flawed “work
point” compensation system kept agricultural productivity growth low and, hence, rural income
growth low.  The whole economic system was structured by central planning to produce a wide
and growing urban-rural income gap.  This is why, before 1979, Cov28 in figure 1 was much
higher than Cov25, and displayed an upward trend relative to Cov25.41
With the reintroduction of markets and the reintegration of the economy into the world
system beginning in 1979, additional factors have emerged to affect the distribution of provincial
income.  They include, among others, the sequence of the economic reforms, the changes in
fiscal policy, the selective spatial relaxation of the regulations restricting foreign investment, and
the geographical location of the province.  Large-scale deregulation was introduced first to the
agricultural sector.  At the same time, there were cutbacks in state investment in the inland
provinces and cutbacks in state subsidies to the poorer provinces—the two types of provinces
that were disproportionately agricultural in orientation.  Still, the overall impact of these policy
changes on the agricultural provinces was positive in 1978–84.  The agricultural boom narrowed
the urban-rural income gap, causing Cov28 and Cov25 in figure 1 to fall during this period.
In 1984, the state began to relax the restrictions on export activities and on the
establishment of non-state industrial enterprises in rural areas, and to extend the preferential
policies on FDI from the southern coastal provinces to other coastal provinces.  Large numbers
of rural enterprises and foreign-funded enterprises started sprouting up in the coastal provinces,
notably in Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Shangdong.  It was very fortunate for these coastal
provinces that these policy changes took place at that time.
By 1984, the agricultural sector was beginning to reach the limit of the benefits created
by the substantial (but still partial) deregulation of agriculture during 1979–82.  These new
policy changes regarding exports, non-state enterprises, and foreign-funded enterprises thus
encouraged the coastal agricultural provinces to switch their engine of growth from farming to
rural industries, just when the one-shot agricultural productivity growth impetus had spent its
                                                
41 Cov28 is the coefficient of variation for the per capita income of 28 provinces.  Cov25 is calculated after
excluding Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin from the sample used for calculating Cov28.
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force.  Lacking the same linkage opportunities to foreign-funded enterprises, and facing higher
costs in transporting goods to foreign markets, the rural enterprise sector in the inland provinces
did not take off as it did in the coastal provinces.  The inland agricultural provinces hence
continued to rely mainly on farming, the flagging engine of growth, as its main economic
activity.
During the 1985–89 period, the coastal agricultural provinces continued their race to
catch up with the three metropolises and the traditionally rich Manchurian provinces.  The
noncoastal agricultural provinces either kept pace with the Manchurian provinces or started
lagging behind them again.42  These differences in performance among the agricultural provinces
vis-à-vis the industrial provinces are responsible for the minor movements of Cov28 and Cov25
in 1985–89, shown in figure 1.
Liaoning’s ranking in provincial GDP per capita was overtaken by Guangdong in 1992,
by Zheijiang in 1994, and by Jiangsu in 1995.  By 1995, Fujian’s GDP per capita was less than 2
percent below that of Liaoning.  The important point is that these four coastal provinces
continued growing faster than Liaoning in the subsequent 1996–99 period (see part A of table
16).  When the average 1996–99 growth rate of the six provinces in table 16 is regressed on the
1995 GDP level and a coast dummy, the respective coefficients are –0.0011 and 3.86, with
respective absolute t-statistics of 2.4 and 4.0.43  The presence of conditional income
convergence, but not unconditional income convergence, in these six provinces is in line with the
regression results in tables 12 and 13.  In brief, the 1992–98 period is characterized by the newly
rich coastal provinces continuing to grow faster than the traditionally rich northeastern
provinces, and the still-backward northwestern and southwestern provinces growing at about the
same or lower pace than the northeastern provinces.  The result is a divergence in provincial
incomes in the 1990s that caused Cov28 and Cov25 in figure 1 to rise to unprecedented levels.
In part B of table 16, we use the average values of the estimated coefficients of Pop100cr
and Policy from equation 6 in table 12, and equations 6 and 9 in table 13, to quantify the
contributions of geographical location and preferential policies to the growth rates of provinces
in the different regions.  In the 1996–99 period, the growth rate of the typical coastal province
                                                
42 For example, Fujian (coastal) moved from seventeenth place in 1978 to tenth place in 1991; Heilongjiang
(northeastern) fell from fourth in 1978 to fifth in 1984 and then to seventh in 1991; and Hubei (central), which had
risen from eighteenth in 1978 to fifteenth in 1984, fell back to eighteenth in 1991.  See table 6.
43 A constant term was included in the regression.
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benefited about equally from its geographical location (2.84 percentage points) and preferential
polices (2.83 percentage points).  The level of each type of benefit received by the coastal
provinces was higher than the level received by provinces in other regions.  Thanks to the
navigable portions of the Yellow River and the Yangtze River, a central province received a
boost of 1.99 percentage points to its growth rate, which is higher than the boost from
preferential policies, 1.56 percentage points.  Compared to a northwestern or a southwestern
province, a northeastern province was more favored by geography and preferential policies.
The growth decomposition yields two important observations for economic policy.  First,
the faster growth of the coastal provinces could not be largely attributed to the more preferential
policies that they had received.  The coastal location was as important as the preferential policies
in promoting growth.  Second, despite the significant easing of regulations on FDI and
international trade in the interior provinces since 1992, the difference in the level of deregulation
(“preferential treatment”) in 1996–98 was still quite large, causing a one percentage point gap
between the coastal provinces and the central, northwestern, and southwestern provinces.  The
average preferential policy index value in 1996–99 was 2.0 for the typical northeastern province,
2.4 for the typical coastal province, 1.3 for the typical central and northwestern province, and 1.5
for the typical southwestern province.
We should note that the metropolises (with province-level status, excluding Chongqing)
are definitely more “preferred” than the coastal provinces.  The preferential policy index value
for the typical metropolis in this period was 3.0, higher than any of the regional groups.  GDP
per capita of the average metropolis grew 9.88 percent in 1996–99, with 2.45 percentage points
contribution from Pop100cr and 3.50 percentage points from Policy.
If the preferential policies directed toward FDI had been absent for all provinces in 1996–
99, the central provinces would have shown the highest growth rates (8.73 percent), but the
coastal provinces would still have grown faster than the northeastern, northwestern, and
southwestern provinces.  Furthermore, because the preferential policies had a positive impact on
the growth of the inland provinces, the elimination of preferential policies to equalize policy
treatment of the provinces would have been a negative shock to the inland provinces.  Since the
troubling aspect about the preferential policies was not their effectiveness, but the unequal access
to them, the solution lies in increasing the access of the inland provinces to the preferential
policies rather than in denying these policies to everyone.  The central government acted
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correctly in the last two years when it reduced its preferential treatment of the coastal SEZs, not
by removing the various tax and foreign exchange exemptions that they could grant to FDI, but
by allowing the inland economic zones to extend these same exemptions to FDI.  Part B of table
16 gives the counterfactual growth scenario for the case where Policy = 2, the index value for the
northeastern provinces, for all provinces.  The outcome would have been a higher GDP growth
rate and a reduction in the coefficient of variation for provincial income (as incomes of the
poorer provinces increase faster, with a 0.5 percentage point decline in the growth rates of
coastal provinces).
The presence of only conditional convergence and not unconditional convergence in
China stands in marked contrast with Barro and Sala-Martin’s finding of unconditional
convergence in the United States.  We attribute this difference between the United States and
China, primarily, to China’s household registration system, and, secondarily, to its incomplete
reform of the state bank system.  Under the household registration system, only approved people
have the right to live and work permanently in urban areas, and receive publicly provided social
services such as education and medical care.  The police issue residence permits (hukou) to the
approved people.  Because residence status is largely determined by place of birth,44 the hukou
system in effect denies the poor the possibility of getting a higher-paying job legally by moving
to the prosperous cities.  The U.S. experience suggests that gradual movements in population
over the last century away from the northern plains to the two coasts was fundamental to the
working of the income convergence process.  China’s hukou system was therefore likely to have
been a major reason for the increase in provincial inequality.
While international experiences indicate that labor tends to flow from the poor regions to
the rich regions, they also indicate (unfortunately) that capital has a less reliable tendency to flow
from high-wage areas to low-wage areas.  In not a small number of cases, capital actually flowed
from the low-wage to the high-wage areas.45  In some of these “perverse” cases, this reverse flow
could be traced to the already prosperous urban centers being the centers of endogenous growth,
where continual technological innovations kept the rate of return to investment high.  The
implication is that when China’s metropolises and other large coastal cities do develop into
                                                
44 This is conditional upon the parents being legal residents of that place at the time of birth.
45 A glaring example in the international context would be the large net capital inflows to the United States in the
last twenty years.
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endogenous growth centers in the future, labor mobility is the only easy solution to slow (or
reverse) the increase in regional inequality.
Since China’s metropolises and other coastal cities are not yet centers of endogenous
growth, the reason for the trickle of capital46 from the coast to the interior obviously lies
elsewhere.  It lies in the monopoly state bank system and in the continued existence of loss-
making SOEs.  By using up a large portion of the private saving deposits in the banking system
to prop up the inefficient SOEs, the government has hindered the establishment of new
businesses everywhere, including those in the interior provinces.  The state banks have
contributed to regional inequality because they are non-profit-maximizing, and, out of
bureaucratic inertia, bureaucratic ease, and bureaucratic fear of risk, they have allocated the
leftover capital to their traditionally biggest customers, the SOEs on the coast and in the
northeast.
The crucial point here is that there are many important factors that contributed to the
widening of regional disparity.  Besides being geographically disadvantaged, the interior
provinces could not shed the labor in their low-productivity agriculture sectors because of the
hukou system; they were denied access to capital because of the bureaucratic nature of the state
banks; and they faced more stringent regulations governing FDI and international trade.
Accordingly, given the wide array of causes, the appropriate policy response has to be a
multifaceted one.  The “good” news is that there are some quick fixes available to ameliorate the
situation.  Two of the three man-made factors—the hukou system and anti-internationalization
regulations—could be eliminated overnight in order to help the income convergence process to
work.
The flaws of the state bank system will take longer to fix because in addition to interest
rate deregulation and the easing of entry into the bank sector, an effective system of prudential
supervision has to be established.  The barriers to abating the distance between the different
levels of steady-state provincial incomes created by geography will take even longer to fix.
Large-scale infrastructure projects such as roads and railways would definitively help in reducing
geography-related constraints and should be targeted to facilitate transactions and reduce
transportation costs, even if better communications in the northwestern provinces might end up
facilitating the relocation of their residents to the coast more than encouraging the migration of
                                                
46 Excluding the recent large capital inflow for infrastructure construction.
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coastal firms to the northwest.  The relevant consideration is that this labor movement will
improve the welfare of the rural poor in the interior provinces.
The government clearly recognizes the great importance of providing infrastructure to
overcome production bottlenecks and facilitate international economic integration.  Infrastructure
construction stands first in the following list of priority tasks in the strategy to develop the
western provinces (State Council 2000):
• developing infrastructure




• enhancing science, technology, education, and public health
While infrastructure investment could reduce regional disparity, the development strategy
for the interior provinces has to be more creative than simply building clones of Shenzhen in the
northwestern and southwestern provinces.  The development problem is clearly more
complicated than that; hence we feel that science, technology, education, and public health has
been given too low a ranking in the above priority list.  This concern stems from our belief that,
once a market economy is in place, technological advancement is the fundamental engine of
sustainable development.  The ultimate prize of western development efforts is the successful
incubation of two or three centers of endogenous growth in western China.  If the incubation
effort is too ambitious, the next objective is to create sufficient local scientific capacity to hasten
the diffusion of new technologies from the coastal provinces and foreign countries to western
China.  Because education lies at the heart of the ability to acquire and innovate new
technologies, it should not be at the bottom of the priority list.
Even in the worst case scenario, in which neither technological innovation centers nor
technological diffusion centers could be successfully established, good education and good
health would enable individuals who migrate to the coastal provinces to get higher-paying jobs
and contribute to the technological progress there.  Compared to physical capital formation,
human capital formation has a much lower wastage rate because humans can move and bridges
and tunnels cannot.
The high priority that the State Council (2000) has accorded to environmental protection
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is farsighted.  The high priority given to agricultural development is certainly correct because the
bulk of the population in the western and central provinces is still engaged in agricultural
production.  It is important, however, that agriculture be strengthened not just by provision of
physical infrastructure but also by agriculture-related technology transfers, such as the following:
1. the development of new varieties of local crops that have higher yields, are more disease-
resistant, and require less water to grow;
2. the improvement of the local livestock through cross-breeding, and through better access
to veterinarian services; and
3. the development of new processed food products from the local agricultural base.
It needs re-emphasizing that the causes of regional inequality are many.  The frequent
lone focus on the role of preferential policies is really not justified, even though it is
understandable because the term “preferential” smacks of undeserved transfers.  Geographical
factors have been quantitatively just as important as preferential policies in the growth of the
coastal provinces, and yet while there have been many discussions about removing these
preferential policies, there have not been enough discussions about solving the geographic
barriers to growth in the interior provinces.  Just as the talk about removing the preferential
policies is wrongheaded because the more sensible step is to extend what are really deregulation
policies to the rest of the country, the talk about increasing physical capital formation to
overcome geographic barriers is inadequate, because only human capital formation can come up
with better solutions to these centuries-old problems.  Bringing in science to bear on the growth
of the western provinces is only one aspect of the multi-pronged approach required to ameliorate
regional disparity.  There are many more aspects that require careful study, for example, the
forms of urbanization that would be most effective in generating growth in different areas within
western China.  We hope to discuss this and other important topics in future papers.
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Notes: Hainan and Tibet are excluded due to missing data. Sichuan province
includes Chongqing. GDP per capita is calculated at constant 1995 prices.
σ-convergence is measured by the coefficient of variation.
Sources: NBS (1999a), except for Sichuan, for which sources are SSB (1997a,
1997b, 1998), and NBS (1999b).
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Table 1.  Coefficient of variation of GDP per capita
COV28 COV25
(28 provinces) (25 provinces)
Average 1952-1965 0.442 0.313
Average 1966-1978 0.570 0.302
Average 1979-1989 0.642 0.297
Average 1990-1998 0.659 0.387
COV28 is the coefficient of variation for 28 provinces (Tibet, Hainan
were excluded, and Chongqing was included in Sichuan).
COV25 is the coefficient of variation for 25 provinces (COV28
minus Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai).
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area) (%) (meters) (Degrees) (mm) (%)
Metropolises 8.5 3,645 1,104 77 65 71 1.4 1.2 135 10.9 63 36
Northeast 7.9 1,700 138 380 17 18 2.2 1.6 314 4.5 50 21
Coast 10.7 1,154 333 86 60 82 2.6 2.4 267 16.4 103 29
Central 8.4 941 264 492 0 57 2.7 2.4 428 14.9 90 24
Northwest 7.7 1,045 46 1,383 0 0 5.0 2.8 1,971 6.8 26 8
Southwest 7.8 814 126 656 4 4 14.1 5.2 1,428 16.0 98 10
Total 9.0 1,355 290 547 24 41 4.3 2.7 804 12.2 74 21
Notes: GDP per capita compound annual growth rate throughout 1979-98 and GDP per capita levels in 1978 are calculated at 1995 constant prices. Pop100cr = proportion of
the population distribution of a province in 1994 within 100 km of the coastline or ocean-navigable river, excluding coastline above the winter extent of sea ice and the rivers
that flow to this coastline. Pop100km = proportion of the population distribution of a province in 1994 within 100 km of the coastline, excluding coastline above the winter
extent of sea ice. Slope >10 measures the percentage of area within a province with a slope greater than 10 %. Temperature and rainfall are averages throughout the 1951-88
period. Arable land is available for 1994.
Metropolises = Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai.
Northeast = Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang.
Coast = Hebei, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, and Hainan.
Central = Shanxi, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, and Hunan.
Northwest = Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang (Tibet is excluded due to missing data).
Southwest = Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, and Guangxi.
Sources: NBS (1999) for economic and population variables; GIS calculations made by Bao Shuming for geographical data, except arable land; Wang and Hu (1999, table
4.1, p. 83) for arable land.
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Table 3.   Timeline of China’s regional preferential policies, 1979-94
Year of
approval
Number and type of opened zone Location
1979 3 Special Economic Zones Guangdong
1980 1 Special Economic Zone Fujian
1984 14 Coastal Open Cities
10 Economic and Technological Development Zones
Liaoning, Hebei, Tianjin, Shandong,
Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian,
Guangdong, and Guangxi
Liaoning, Hebei, Tianjin, Shandong,
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Guangdong
1985 1 Economic and Technological Development Zone
3 Coastal Open Economic Zones
Fujian
Pearl River delta, Yangtze River delta,
and Fujian
1986 2 Economic and Technological Development Zones Shanghai
1988 Open Coastal Belt
1 Special Economic Zone
1 Economic and Technological Development Zone
Liaoning, Shandong, Guangxi, and Hebei
Hainan
Shanghai
1990 Pudong New Area Shanghai
1992 13 bonded areas in major coastal port cities
10 major cities along the Yangtze River
13 Border Economic Cooperation Zones
All capital cities of inland provinces and autonomous
regions
5 Economic and Technological Development Zones
Tianjin, Guangdong, Liaoning,
Shandong Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, and
Hainan
Jiangsu, Anhui, Jiangxi, Hunan, Hubei,
and Sichuan
Jilin, Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia,
Xinjiang, Yunnan, and Guangxi
Fujian, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Shandong, and
Zhejiang
1993 12 Economic and Technological Development Zones Anhui, Guangdong, Heilongjiang, Hubei,
Liaoning, Sichuan, Fujian, Jilin, and
Zhejiang
1994 2 Economic and Technological Development Zones Beijing and Xinjiang
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Table 4.   Growth episodes by region
1953-98 1953-78 1979-98













Metropolises 5.6 3.3 5.4 -4.6 6.5 7.9 6.8 5.5 11.4
North-east 4.2 1.7 5.5 -6.8 3.6 7.3 6.4 6.2 8.7
Coast 5.5 1.8 2.8 -1.0 2.9 10.3 8.8 7.7 13.1
Center 4.2 1.5 5.2 -3.0 2.0 7.8 7.7 4.9 11.2
Northwest 4.3 1.6 7.1 -2.8 2.5 7.7 7.1 6.9 7.9
Southwest 4.2 1.0 5.8 -0.9 1.7 7.4 6.7 5.4 9.1
National mean 4.8 1.7 4.9 -2.6 2.7 8.6 7.6 6.3 11.2
Gap between highest and
lowest, in percentage points
1.5 2.3 4.3 5.9 4.8 3.0 2.4 2.8 5.1
Note: Average annual growth rates are calculated by regressing the logarithm of per capita GDP on a time trend. GDP per capita is measured at 1995 constant prices. Tibet is
not included due to missing data for GDP components.
Sources: See Figure 1.
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Shanghai 5.7 3.4 5.1 -4.3 6.4 8.2 6.6 5.5 12.7
Beijing 5.8 3.0 7.3 -5.9 8.1 8.0 7.8 6.5 9.3
Tianjin 5.5 3.8 7.5 -5.0 5.8 7.5 6.3 4.4 11.9
Northeast
Jilin 4.0 0.8 0.8 -3.0 1.8 8.3 8.5 6.5 10.0
Liaoning 4.9 2.6 7.4 -7.6 5.5 7.8 6.2 6.6 8.9
Heilongjiang 3.5 1.0 5.3 -7.9 2.4 6.3 5.7 5.5 7.9
Coast
Guangdong 5.4 1.5 4.5 0.8 1.7 11.5 8.9 11.0 12.2
Fujian 5.1 0.9 5.2 -2.2 1.6 10.8 9.8 7.9 14.6
Zhejiang 5.5 1.5 3.3 -0.1 2.3 10.5 9.7 6.6 13.8
Jiangsu 5.9 2.3 0.5 1.6 3.6 10.3 8.6 7.6 13.5
Hainan 10.0 9.0 7.7 9.0
Shandong 5.9 2.5 3.3 -2.0 4.0 10.0 10.0 6.5 13.0
Hebei 4.5 1.2 1.4 -5.5 2.9 8.4 6.1 6.0 12.1
Central
Henan 4.9 1.8 3.1 -4.9 2.8 8.4 9.2 5.7 11.5
Hubei 4.4 1.4 8.1 -2.1 2.0 8.1 7.7 5.0 11.6
Anhui 4.0 1.6 4.3 -1.0 1.6 8.0 8.6 3.4 13.3
Jiangxi 3.5 0.8 3.8 -3.0 0.4 8.0 6.6 6.0 11.3
Hunan 4.0 1.5 5.7 -3.8 2.3 7.0 5.8 5.0 9.8
Shanxi 3.9 1.4 6.2 -4.0 2.1 6.9 7.8 3.8 9.1
Northwest
Xinjiang 4.1 0.2 7.4 -1.8 -0.6 8.7 8.5 8.0 7.5
Inner Mongolia 3.9 0.7 7.7 -5.3 1.9 7.8 8.5 6.0 8.7
Shaanxi 4.6 1.9 6.8 -3.9 3.0 7.8 7.4 7.4 7.7
Gansu 4.5 2.2 5.6 -2.4 5.3 7.4 3.8 7.4 8.4
Ningxia 4.3 2.8 5.2 0.5 3.1 6.5 6.2 5.6 6.8
Qinghai 3.6 2.6 7.1 3.0 2.2 5.3 5.9 3.5 6.4
Southwest
Yunnan 4.4 1.7 5.9 0.7 2.0 8.0 7.7 7.3 8.8
Sichuan 4.3 0.6 5.3 -0.4 1.0 7.5 6.3 5.4 9.2
Guangxi 4.5 2.6 7.1 -1.4 4.2 7.2 6.2 4.5 10.3
Guizhou 3.1 -0.4 6.5 -3.5 0.1 6.5 8.6 4.6 6.5
Note: GDP per capita is measured at 1995 constant prices. Annual growth rates are calculated by regressing the
logarithm of per capita GDP on a time trend. Tibet is not included due to missing data for GDP components.
Sources: See Figure 1.
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Table 6.  Ranking of Chinese provinces by GDP per capita
Province Rank in GDP per capita level (constant price 1995)
1952 1958 1965 1978 1952-78 shift 1984 1991 1998 1978-98 shift
Shanghai 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
Beijing 9 5 4 2 7 2 2 2 0
Tianjin 4 3 2 3 1 3 3 3 0
Zhejiang 7 11 9 7 0 6 6 4 3
Guangdong 8 9 8 9 -1 8 5 5 4
Jiangsu 12 22 16 8 4 7 8 6 2
Fujian 11 13 12 16 -5 10 10 7 9
Liaoning 5 4 7 5 0 4 4 8 -3
Shandong 22 24 24 17 5 11 11 9 8
Heilongjiang 2 2 3 4 -2 5 7 10 -6
Hebei 6 16 19 11 -5 16 15 11 0
Hainan 21 19 13 12 9
Xinjiang 10 6 5 14 -4 13 9 13 1
Jilin 3 10 10 10 -7 12 12 14 -4
Hubei 18 12 15 18 0 15 18 15 3
Inner Mongolia 15 7 13 19 -4 18 16 16 3
Shanxi 17 8 11 13 4 14 19 17 -4
Hunan 13 15 18 15 -2 20 20 18 -3
Anhui 19 18 17 23 -3 21 27 19 4
Henan 23 26 27 26 -2 24 24 20 6
Qinghai 16 14 6 6 10 9 14 21 -15
Ningxia 20 19 14 12 8 17 17 22 -10
Guangxi 25 23 23 20 5 23 25 23 -3
Jiangxi 14 17 20 25 -10 27 26 24 1
Sichuan 21 20 21 22 0 22 21 25 -3
Yunnan 26 27 22 24 3 25 22 26 -2
Shaanxi 27 25 26 27 1 26 23 27 0
Gansu 28 28 28 28 1 29 28 28 0
Guizhou 24 21 25 29 -4 28 29 29 0
Note: The 1952-78 shifts are calculated without taking Hainan into consideration. Tibet is not included due to
missing data for GDP components.
Sources: See Figure 1.
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Table 7.  Gaps between the top-5 and bottom-5 provinces in GDP per capita
GDP per capita level 1952 1958 1965 1978 1985 1992 1998
Top-5 1,028 1,650 1,445 2,500 3,797 5,607 12,759
Bottom-5 403 583 543 746 1,157 1,770 3,557
National mean 616 838 780 1,143 1,849 2,929 6,400
Absolute income gap 625 1,067 901 1,754 2,641 3,837 9,202
Relative income gap 1.01 1.27 1.16 1.54 1.43 1.31 1.44
Income ratio, Top-5/Bottom-5 2.55 2.83 2.66 3.35 3.28 3.17 3.59
Note: GDP per capita is measured at 1995 constant prices by summing up the sectoral components. The average
GDP per capita level is computed as the weighted sum of per capita provincial GDP levels, the weights being
the provincial share in total population of the group (top-5, bottom-5 or all provinces). Top-5 are the five richest
provinces in a particular year and bottom-5 are the five poorest provinces in a particular year. The relative gap is
the difference between the top-5 and bottom-5 divided by the national mean.
Sources: See Figure 1.
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Table 8.  Agricultural share of employment and GDP in selected provinces
Share of employment, % Share of GDP (1995 prices), %
1978 1988 1998 1978 1988 1998
National 70.5 59.4 49.8 41.3 28.2 17.4
Northeast
Liaoning 47.5 33.6 33.6 25.2 17.0 14.1
Heilongjiang 52.6 38.5 48.6 28.2 20.1 17.4
Coast
Guangdong 73.7 53.7 41.1 46.5 29.2 12.9
Zhejiang 73.6 51.2 42.4 55.6 28.7 13.1
Central
Henan 80.6 67.6 58.9 53.8 35.5 23.8
Anhui 81.7 68.5 59.4 64.1 44.3 25.3
Northwest
Shaanxi 71.1 63.6 59.0 42.2 26.9 20.9
Gansu 76.9 67.7 59.9 28.4 25.7 17.1
Southwest
Sichuan 81.8 73.0 62.3 59.2 39.6 24.2
Guizhou 82.8 78.1 69.7 57.9 43.6 31.0
Notes: For Gansu, employment in agricultural sector was available only from 1983 onward.  In 1983, the rural




Table 9.  Summary of regressions results of GDP per capita in benchmark years
on topographic characteristics
Variables Impact Robustness Without metropolises
1952
Distance from the coast + Always 10% level No change
Pop100cr Never significant No change
Pop100km + Always 5% level Less significant
Slope over 10% - Around 5% No change
Average slope - Always 5% level Less significant
Average elevation Never significant No change
1978
Distance from the coast + Around 10% Less significant
Pop100cr Never significant No change
Pop100km + 5-10% No change
Slope over 10% - Around 5% Less significant
Average slope - Always 5% level No change
Average elevation Non significant Better results
1998
Distance from the coast + Strongly significant No change
Pop100cr + Strongly significant No change
Pop100km + Strongly significant No change
Slope over 10% - Around 5% Less significant
Average slope - Variable Less significant
Average elevation Never significant No change
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Table 10.  Selected growth-related regressions from the literature
(constant term omitted, brackets contain absolute t-statistics)
Jian, Sachs and Warner (1996): Explaining Regional Growth, cross section








Eq 2 -0.009 0.08 0.021
[1.11] [1.88] [3.93]
Wang and Hu (1999): Explaining foreign investment flows into provinces, cross section
(dependent variable is accumulated foreign capital over 1983-95)








Economic Model 0.383 0.348 0.292 0.037
Eq 3 [2.26] [2.26] [1.71] [0.23]
Political Economy Model 0.239 0.023 -0.208 0.025 0.858
Eq 4 [2.09] [0.20] [1.48] [0.24] [5.83]
Bao, Chang, Sachs and Woo (forthcoming): Explaining provincial growth, cross section
(dependent variable is average annual provincial GDP growth rate, 1978-97)
GDP 1978 Inverse distance Coastline length Pop100km Elevation
Eq 5 -0.178 375.02 245.57
[2.88] [1.76] [3.91]
Eq 6 -0.178 361.5 209.87 -0.023
[2.88] [1.69] [2.82] [.90]
Eq 7 -0.063 0.098 113.19 -0.020
[1.53] [4.89] [1.88] [1.06]
Zhang (forthcoming): Explaining provincial growth, cross section











1978-84 -0.03 0.025 0.612 0.012 -0.013
Eq 8 [5.36] [1.16] [0.65] [1.48] [1.81]
1985-95 -0.027 0.009 0.809 0.031 -0.009
Eq 9 [7.42] [2.15] [4.47] [6.96] [1.44]
1985-95 -0.028 0.092 0.094 0.025 -0.008
Eq 10 [7.70] [1.25] [4.09] [4.07] [1.34]
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Table 11.   Preferential policy index
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Average
Beijing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0.67
Tianjin 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1.43
Hebei 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1.24
Shanxi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.33
Inner Mongolia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0.67
Liaoning 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1.24
Jilin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0.67
Heilongjiang 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0.67
Shanghai 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1.76
Jiangsu 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1.43
Zhejiang 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1.43
Anhui 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 0.62
Fujian 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2.71
Jiangxi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.33
Shandong 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1.43
Henan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.33
Hubei 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 0.62
Hunan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.33
Guangdong 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2.86
Guangxi 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1.24
Hainan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1.57
Sichuan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 0.62
Guizhou 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.33
Yunnan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0.67
Tibet 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.33
Shaanxi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.33
Gansu 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.33
Qinghai 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.33
Ningxia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.33
Xinjiang 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0.67
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Table 12.  Initial disentangling of geography and policy, cross-section regressions
Initial Coast
Period GDP level dummy Pop100cr Policy R2
Part A: Subperiod averaged
Eq 1 1979-84 -0.0133 0.0173
1.55 2.98 0.26
Eq 2 1985-91 0.0002 0.0223
0.02 3.09 0.34
Eq 3 1992-98 -0.0025 0.0387
0.20 5.11 0.52
Eq 4 1979-84 -0.0123 0.0151 0.0056
1.47 2.31 2.88 0.28
Eq 5 1985-91 -0.0034 -0.0064 0.0119
0.29 0.73 2.67 0.38
Eq 6 1992-98 -0.0060 0.0427 0.0099
0.57 7.14 1.35 0.71
Part B: Entire period averaged
Eq 7 1979-98 -0.0082 0.0267
1.14 5.92 0.64
Eq 8 1979-98 -0.0122 0.0145 0.0136
2.18 3.51 8.37 0.77
Part C: Characteristics of preferential policy and geography variables
National Northeast Coast Central Northwest Southwest
Pop100cr Mean 0.379 0.176 0.818 0.574 0.0002 0.039
Standard deviation 0.406 0.285 0.175 0.382 0.0004 0.078
Coefficient of variation 1.071 1.620 0.214 0.666 2.4495 2.000
1979-83 1984-91 1992-98 1979-98
Policy Mean 0.231 0.709 1.753 0.897
Standard deviation 0.636 1.045 0.647 0.697
Coefficient of variation 2.758 1.474 0.369 0.777
Notes: Dependent variable is the average growth rate of per capita GDP of province in indicated period. Constant term not
reported, absolute t-statistic in italic. Chongqing data are included into Sichuan. N=26, Tibet (missing data), Beijing,
Shanghai, and Tianjin are omitted.
Pop100cr = proportion of the provincial population in 1994 living within 100 kilometers of coast and navigable rivers that
flow into the sea.  Policy = degree of exemption from regulations governing FDI, trade and taxation (extent of preferential
treatment received by the province).
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Table 13.  Cross-section growth regressions with structural variables
Period Initial
GDP level








Eq 1 1979-84 -0.0099 0.0084 0.1095 -0.1097 -0.0830
0.61 1.35 0.51 0.41 2.31 0.46
Eq 2 1985-91 -0.0109 0.0224 0.2241 -0.3379 0.0487
0.55 2.57 0.88 0.94 0.87 0.39
Eq 3 1992-98 -0.0065 0.0290 0.3493 -0.4466 -0.1990
0.50 4.40 0.78 0.51 6.15 0.79
Eq 4 1979-84 -0.0086 0.0034 0.0033 0.1165 -0.1170 -0.0849
0.52 0.39 1.53 0.52 0.39 2.21 0.44
Eq 5 1985-91 0.0108 -0.0027 0.0116 0.3477 -0.5057 0.0575
0.56 0.24 2.54 1.68 1.54 0.99 0.47
Eq 6 1992-98 -0.0211 0.0328 0.0111 0.3572 -0.7079 -0.1415
1.65 6.00 2.20 0.88 0.93 4.62 0.84
Eq 7 1979-84 -0.0268 0.0088 0.0053 0.2599 -0.3618 -0.1204 -0.0469 0.1058
1.46 0.64 1.66 1.32 1.38 2.53 0.82 2.10 0.55
Eq 8 1985-91 -0.0009 -0.0060 0.0116 0.5936 -0.8873 0.0554 0.0212 0.0925
0.04 0.41 2.12 2.24 2.04 0.95 0.48 0.98 0.53
Eq 9 1992-98 -0.0237 0.0286 0.0140 0.4221 -0.8323 -0.0587 0.0566 0.0325
1.87 2.47 2.09 1.10 1.15 0.98 1.82 0.74 0.87
Entire period averaged
Eq 10 1979-98 -0.0058 0.0201 0.0935 -0.1013 -0.0615
0.56 5.23 0.74 0.59 2.12 0.76
Eq 11 1979-98 -0.0118 0.0131 0.0117 0.1716 -0.2560 -0.0316
1.48 2.94 5.97 1.72 1.82 1.13 0.83
Eq 12 1979-98 -0.0236 0.0143 0.0128 0.2295 -0.3413 -0.0318 -0.0030 0.0812
3.26 2.32 5.15 3.70 3.59 0.94 0.13 2.27 0.89
Notes: Dependent variable is the average growth rate of per capita GDP of province in indicated period.
Constant term not reported, absolute t-statistic in italic. Chongqing data are included into Sichuan.
For equations 1 to 6, 10 and 11; N=26, Tibet (missing data), Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin are omitted.
For Equations 7, 8, 9 and 12; N=25; Tibet (missing data), Hainan (missing data), Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin are
omitted.
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Table 14.  The key growth mechanisms of the policy and geography variables
Part A: Degree of correlation among Pop100cr, Policy and FDI for different periods




Pop100cr 0.2292 0.3131 0.4101 0.6036




Pop100cr 0.5528 0.4509 0.527 0.5362
0.003 0.021 0.006 0.005
Part B: Foreign direct investments concentrate in regions where rural enterprises bloom
Average provincial share of employment and investment within each region in 1999
Location of Rural
province Total SOE FDI enterprises
Average provincial share of employment
Northeast 2.5 4.9 3.1 2.4
Coast 4.7 4.3 10.7 6.5
Central 4.9 4.5 1.4 4.7
Northwest 1.4 2.1 0.4 1.4
Southwest 5.3 3.8 1.2 2.8
Average provincial share of investment
Northeast 3.1 3.9 2.0 1.7
Coast 7.1 6.0 10.3 8.2
Central 3.3 3.5 2.0 3.4
Northwest 1.4 1.8 0.3 0.8
Southwest 3.3 3.6 1.8 2.9
Notes: Italicized number in Part A refers to the significance level at which the correlation is different from zero.
Part B excludes Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Tibet. Chongqing data are included inside Sichuan.
Table 15. Addition of FDI tends to reduce significance of policy and geography variables
Initial Initial size of Sq (initial size Initial
Period GDP level Pop100cr Policy agriculture of agriculture) SOE size FDI R2
Eq 1 1979-84 -0.0086 0.0034 0.0036 0.1152 -0.1151 -0.0844 -0.1215
0.51 0.38 1.17 0.49 0.37 2.12 0.17 0.44
Eq 2 1985-91 0.0072 -0.0041 0.0038 0.4943 -0.7623 0.0079 1.0530
0.34 0.46 0.95 2.07 2.21 0.13 3.46 0.61
Eq 3 1992-98 -0.0209 0.0319 0.0101 0.3674 -0.7227 -0.1454 0.0179
1.56 4.04 1.39 0.88 0.92 3.61 0.22 0.84
Eq 4 1979-98 -0.0115 0.0125 0.0101 0.1904 -0.2861 -0.0360 0.0665
1.41 2.84 1.88 1.96 2.06 1.05 0.41 0.84
Notes: Dependent variable is the average growth rate of per capita GDP of province in indicated period.
Constant term not reported, absolute t-statistic in italic. Chongqing data included into Sichuan.
N=26, Tibet (missing data), Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin are omitted
Table 16.  Growth in the recent period, 1996-99
Part A:  Caught up and still growing faster
Per Capita  Growth rate of GDP per capita
Income Rank Income Rank GDP in 1995 Average
in 1978 in 1998 (current prices) 1996 1997 1998 1999 1996-99
Northeastren Region
Heilongjiang 4 10 5,465 9.9 9.4 7.7 6.8 8.4
Liaoning 5 8 6,880 8.1 8.4 7.8 7.8 8.0
Coastal Region
Zhejiang 7 4 8,074 12.1 10.5 9.5 9.4 10.4
Guangdong 9 5 8,494 9.1 9.0 8.6 7.9 8.7
Jiangsu 8 6 7,299 11.7 11.5 10.5 9.6 10.8
Fujian 16 7 6,787 14.4 13.5 10.4 9.0 11.8
Part B: Actual and counterfactual growth scenarios for 1996-99 period
Geography Policy Counterfactual annual growth rates, %
Location of Average 1996-99 effect effect No policies to attract Uniform policy toward
province growth rate, % (in percentage points) FDI, i.e. Policy=0 FDI, i.e. Policy=2
Metropolis 9.88 2.45 3.50 6.38 8.72
Northeast 9.19 0.61 2.33 6.86 9.19
Coast 10.72 2.84 2.83 7.88 10.22
Central 10.28 1.99 1.56 8.73 11.06
Northwest 9.32 0.00 1.56 7.76 10.09
Southwest 8.80 0.14 1.75 7.05 9.39
Average of Regions 9.70 1.34 2.25 7.44 9.78
Sources: NBS (2000).
Notes: Part A: Income level is nominal, and income growth rate is real. GDP per capita growth rate = GDP growth rate - population growth rate.
Population growth rate assumed to be same as average annual growth in 1995-98.
Part B: Geography coefficient = 0.0347 which is the average of Eq 6 in table 12, and Eq 6 and 9 in table 13.
Policy coefficient = 0.01167  which is the average of Eq 6 in table 12, and Eq 6 and 9 in table 13.
Value of Policy variable is average value for 1996-98.  Growth rate refers to GDP, not GDP per capita.
Appendix Table.  Pooled estimations with structural variables
Initial Initial Sq. initial Initial
GDP level Coast Pop100cr Policy agricul. agricul. SOE size Transport Education FDI R2
Eq 1 0.0181
3.32 0.15
Eq 2 0.0135 0.0227
3.09 3.85 0.29
Eq 3 -0.0006 0.0149 0.0129
0.09 2.24 3.74 0.41
Eq 4 0.0147 0.0216 -0.1529 0.2839 -0.0155
2.16 2.55 0.79 0.95 0.33 0.31
Eq 5 -0.0050 0.0143 0.0133 -0.1686 0.2349 -0.0064
0.59 1.74 3.88 0.95 0.86 0.16 0.41
Eq 6 -0.0074 0.0082 0.0126 -0.0791 0.1226 0.0340 0.0550 0.0587
0.76 0.75 3.52 0.43 0.43 0.69 1.49 1.28 0.44
Eq 7 -0.0093 0.0141 0.0087 -0.0064 -0.0268 0.0038 0.4432
1.11 1.81 2.64 0.04 0.10 0.10 3.40 0.51
Notes: Dependent variable is the average growth rate of per capita GDP of province in each of the 3 sub-period (a) 1979-84 (b) 1985-91 (c) 1992-98.
Constant term not reported, absolute t-statistic in italic.  Sample excludes Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Hainan and Tibet.  Chongqing data are included into
Sichuan.
Preliminary tests (not reported here) have been performed to ensure that the pooled specification is to be preferred to any individual (fixed or random) effect
specification.
